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Why Was Dresden So Heavily Bombed?
They had heard the “whump a whump” of distant aerial bombings many times before. But on February 13, 1945, the American prisoners of war heard Dresden’s fire sirens howl right above their heads. German guards moved them two stories down into a meat locker. When they came back to the surface, “the city was gone,” remembered writer and social critic Kurt Vonnegut—one of the American POWs who witnessed the bombing of Dresden.
The punishing, three-day Allied bombing attack on Dresden from February 13 to 15 in the final months of World War II became among the most controversial Allied actions of the war. The 800-bomber raid dropped some 2,700 tons of explosives and incendiaries and decimated the German city.
As a major center for Nazi Germany’s rail and road network, Dresden’s destruction was intended to overwhelm German authorities and services and clog all transportation routes with throngs of refugees. The Allied assault came a less than a month after some 19,000 U.S. troops were killed in Germany&aposs last-ditch offensive at the Battle of the Bulge, and three weeks after the grim discovery of the atrocities committed by Nazi forces at Auschwitz.
In an effort to force a surrender, the Dresden bombing was intended to terrorize the civilian population locally and nationwide. It certainly had that effect.
Text: 10 Largest Air to Air Battles in Military History
While the more infamous battles made famous by Hollywood first come to mind, there are numerous other less well-known air-to-air battles in our history that could be considered the most remarkable.
Battle of Kursk
This enormous air battle was considered to be the costliest single day of aerial combat that ultimately ended in a crippling defeat for the Germans.
Battle of Britain
In order to prepare for this enormous battle, German forces gathered over two thousand combat ready planes to attack Britain.
St. Mihiel Air Battle
In this battle, outnumbering the Germans at three to one, the allied forces rose together for one of the first and largest aerial assaults of the time.
Operation Mole Cricket 19
In an incredible tactical maneuver, ninety Israeli aircrafts destroyed eighty of the one hundred Syrian aircrafts without suffering a single loss.
Battle of the Phil. Sea
Seven hundred Japanese planes fought against the United States&rsquo one thousand in one of the most decisive battle of World War Two.
Air Battle of El Mansoura
This battle between Israel and Egypt lasted just under an hour, making it one of the longest aerial battles between jets.
Taking place in MiG Alley, the results of the joint efforts of North Korea and the USSR against the USA is what many experts attribute to the birth of modern jet warfare.
Air Battle Over Nis
This air battle was the only direct conflict that had ever occurred between the USA and the USSR.
The Dieppe Raid
Considered to be the largest single day of air combat in World War Two, this battle took place between Allied Forces and Germany in 1942.
Germany won this aerial battle against Allied forces, but what makes this battle famous is the fact that there were no civilian casualties.
Established in 1819, Norwich University is a nationally recognized institution of higher education, the birthplace of the Reserve Officers&rsquo Training Corps (ROTC), and the first private military college in the United States. Through its online programs, Norwich delivers relevant and applicable curricula that allow its students to make a positive impact on their places of work and their communities.
Norwich University&rsquos Master of Arts in Military History program takes an unbiased and global approach towards exploring military thought, theory and engagement throughout recorded history. The unique curriculum of the online Master of Arts in Military History program was developed by the distinguished faculty of Norwich University and guided by the goals outlined by the American Historical Association. This highly regarded program is designed to help build your proficiency as a historian, and places our world&rsquos military achievements and conflicts in chronological, geographical, political and economic context.
World War II and Area Bombing
An important aspect of the Allied air war against Germany involved what is known as 𠇊rea” or “saturation” bombing. In area bombing, all enemy industry–not just war munitions–is targeted, and civilian portions of cities are obliterated along with troop areas. Before the advent of the atomic bomb, cities were most effectively destroyed through the use of incendiary bombs that caused unnaturally fierce fires in the enemy cities. Such attacks, Allied command reasoned, would ravage the German economy, break the morale of the German people and force an early surrender.
Germany was the first to employ area bombing tactics during its assault on Poland in September 1939. In 1940, during the Battle of Britain, the Luftwaffe failed to bring Britain to its knees by targeting London and other heavily populated areas with area bombing attacks. Stung but unbowed, the Royal Air Force (RAF) avenged the bombings of London and Coventry in 1942 when it launched the first of many saturation bombing attacks against Germany. In 1944, Hitler named the world’s first long-range offensive missile V-1, after “vergeltung,” the German word for “vengeance” and an expression of his desire to repay Britain for its devastating bombardment of Germany.
The Allies never overtly admitted that they were engaged in saturation bombing specific military targets were announced in relation to every attack. However, it was but a veneer, and few mourned the destruction of German cities that built the weapons and bred the soldiers that by 1945 had killed more than 10 million Allied soldiers and even more civilians. The firebombing of Dresden would prove the exception to this rule.
The first raid on Tokyo was the Doolittle Raid of 18 April 1942, when sixteen B-25 Mitchells were launched from USS Hornet to attack targets including Yokohama and Tokyo and then fly on to airfields in China. The raid was retaliation against the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The raid did little damage to Japan's war capability but was a significant propaganda victory for the United States.  Launched at longer range than planned when the task force encountered a Japanese picket boat, all of the attacking aircraft either crashed or ditched short of the airfields designated for landing. One aircraft landed in the neutral Soviet Union where the crew was interned, but then smuggled over the border into Iran on 11 May 1943. Two crews were captured by the Japanese in occupied China. Three crewmen from these groups were later executed.  
The key development for the bombing of Japan was the B-29 Superfortress strategic bomber, which had an operational range of 3,250 nautical miles (3,740 mi 6,020 km) and was capable of attacking at high altitude above 30,000 feet (9,100 m), where enemy defenses were very weak. Almost 90% of the bombs dropped on the home islands of Japan were delivered by this type of bomber. Once Allied ground forces had captured islands sufficiently close to Japan, airfields were built on those islands (particularly Saipan and Tinian) and B-29s could reach Japan for bombing missions. 
The initial raids were carried out by the Twentieth Air Force operating out of mainland China in Operation Matterhorn under XX Bomber Command, but these could not reach Tokyo. Operations from the Northern Mariana Islands commenced in November 1944 after the XXI Bomber Command was activated there. 
The high-altitude bombing attacks using general-purpose bombs were observed to be ineffective by USAAF leaders due to high winds—later discovered to be the jet stream—which carried the bombs off target. 
Between May and September 1943, bombing trials were conducted on the Japanese Village set-piece target, located at the Dugway Proving Grounds.  These trials demonstrated the effectiveness of incendiary bombs against wood-and-paper buildings, and resulted in Curtis LeMay ordering the bombers to change tactics to utilize these munitions against Japan. 
The first such raid was against Kobe on 4 February 1945. Tokyo was hit by incendiaries on 25 February 1945 when 174 B-29s flew a high altitude raid during daylight hours and destroyed around 643 acres (260 ha) (2.6 km 2 ) of the snow-covered city, using 453.7 tons of mostly incendiaries with some fragmentation bombs.  After this raid, LeMay ordered the B-29 bombers to attack again but at a relatively low altitude of 5,000 to 9,000 ft (1,500 to 2,700 m) and at night, because Japan's anti-aircraft artillery defenses were weakest in this altitude range, and the fighter defenses were ineffective at night. LeMay ordered all defensive guns but the tail gun removed from the B-29s so that the aircraft would be lighter and use less fuel. 
Operation Meetinghouse Edit
On the night of 9–10 March 1945,  334 B-29s took off to raid with 279 of them dropping 1,665 tons of bombs on Tokyo. The bombs were mostly the 500-pound (230 kg) E-46 cluster bomb which released 38 napalm-carrying M-69 incendiary bomblets at an altitude of 2,000–2,500 ft (610–760 m). The M-69s punched through thin roofing material or landed on the ground in either case they ignited 3–5 seconds later, throwing out a jet of flaming napalm globs. A lesser number of M-47 incendiaries were also dropped: the M-47 was a 100-pound (45 kg) jelled-gasoline and white phosphorus bomb which ignited upon impact. In the first two hours of the raid, 226 of the attacking aircraft unloaded their bombs to overwhelm the city's fire defenses.  The first B-29s to arrive dropped bombs in a large X pattern centered in Tokyo's densely populated working class district near the docks in both Koto and Chūō city wards on the water later aircraft simply aimed near this flaming X. The individual fires caused by the bombs joined to create a general conflagration, which would have been classified as a firestorm but for prevailing winds gusting at 17 to 28 mph (27 to 45 km/h).  Approximately 15.8 square miles (4,090 ha) of the city were destroyed and some 100,000 people are estimated to have died.   A grand total of 282 of the 339 B-29s launched for "Meetinghouse" made it to the target, 27 of which were lost due to being shot down by Japanese air defenses, mechanical failure, or being caught in updrafts caused by the fires. 
Damage to Tokyo's heavy industry was slight until firebombing destroyed much of the light industry that was used as an integral source for small machine parts and time-intensive processes. Firebombing also killed or made homeless many workers who had taken part in the war industry. Over 50% of Tokyo's industry was spread out among residential and commercial neighborhoods firebombing cut the whole city's output in half.  The destruction and damage was especially severe in the eastern areas of the city. [ citation needed ]
Emperor Hirohito's tour of the destroyed areas of Tokyo in March 1945 was the beginning of his personal involvement in the peace process, culminating in Japan's surrender six months later. 
Casualty estimates Edit
The US Strategic Bombing Survey later estimated that nearly 88,000 people died in this one raid, 41,000 were injured, and over a million residents lost their homes. The Tokyo Fire Department estimated a higher toll: 97,000 killed and 125,000 wounded. The Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department established a figure of 83,793 dead and 40,918 wounded and 286,358 buildings and homes destroyed.  Historian Richard Rhodes put deaths at over 100,000, injuries at a million and homeless residents at a million.  These casualty and damage figures could be low Mark Selden wrote in Japan Focus:
The figure of roughly 100,000 deaths, provided by Japanese and American authorities, both of whom may have had reasons of their own for minimizing the death toll, seems to be arguably low in light of population density, wind conditions, and survivors' accounts. With an average of 103,000 inhabitants per square mile (396 people per hectare) and peak levels as high as 135,000 per square mile (521 people per hectare), the highest density of any industrial city in the world, and with firefighting measures ludicrously inadequate to the task, 15.8 square miles (41 km 2 ) of Tokyo were destroyed on a night when fierce winds whipped the flames and walls of fire blocked tens of thousands fleeing for their lives. An estimated 1.5 million people lived in the burned out areas. 
In his 1968 book, reprinted in 1990, historian Gabriel Kolko cited a figure of 125,000 deaths.  Elise K. Tipton, professor of Japan studies, arrived at a rough range of 75,000 to 200,000 deaths.  Donald L. Miller, citing Knox Burger, stated that there were "at least 100,000" Japanese deaths and "about one million" injured. 
The Operation Meetinghouse firebombing of Tokyo on the night of 9 March 1945 was the single deadliest air raid of World War II,  greater than Dresden,  Hamburg, Hiroshima, or Nagasaki as single events.  
After the war, Tokyo struggled to rebuild. In 1945 and 1946, the city received a share of the national reconstruction budget roughly proportional to its amount of bombing damage (26.6%), but in successive years Tokyo saw its share dwindle. By 1949, Tokyo was given only 10.9% of the budget at the same time there was runaway inflation devaluing the money. Occupation authorities such as Joseph Dodge stepped in and drastically cut back on Japanese government rebuilding programs, focusing instead on simply improving roads and transportation. Tokyo did not experience fast economic growth until the 1950s. 
Between 1948 and 1951 the ashes of 105,400 people killed in the attacks on Tokyo were interred in Yokoamicho Park in Sumida Ward. A memorial to the raids was opened in the park in March 2001.  The park has a list of names of people who died of the Bombing, which is made based on the applications from bereaved families and it has 81,273 names as of March 2020.  Bereaved families can submit application to have the names of victims written in the list to the government of Tokyo. 
After the war, Japanese author Katsumoto Saotome, a survivor of 10 March 1945 firebombing, helped start a library about the raid in Koto Ward called the Center of the Tokyo Raids and War Damage. The library contains documents and literature about the raid plus survivor accounts collected by Saotome and the Association to Record the Tokyo Air Raid. 
In 2007, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe apologized in print, acknowledging Japan's guilt in the bombing of Chinese cities and civilians beginning in 1938. He wrote that the Japanese government should have surrendered as soon as losing the war was inevitable, an action that would have prevented Tokyo from being firebombed in March 1945, as well as subsequent bombings of other cities.  In 2013, during his second term as prime minister, Abe's cabinet stated that the raids were "incompatible with humanitarianism, which is one of the foundations of international law", but also noted that it is difficult to argue that the raids were illegal under the international laws of the time.  
In 2007, 112 members of the Association for the Bereaved Families of the Victims of the Tokyo Air Raids brought a class action against the Japanese government, demanding an apology and 1.232 billion yen in compensation. Their suit charged that the Japanese government invited the raid by failing to end the war earlier, and then failed to help the civilian victims of the raids while providing considerable support to former military personnel and their families.  The plaintiffs' case was dismissed at the first judgement in December 2009, and their appeal was rejected.  The plaintiffs then appealed to the Supreme Court, which rejected their case in May 2013. 
Luftwaffe and strategic bombing Edit
In the 1920s and 1930s, airpower theorists such as Giulio Douhet and Billy Mitchell claimed that air forces could win wars, obviating the need for land and sea combat.  It was thought that bombers would always get through and could not be resisted, particularly at night. Industry, seats of government, factories and communications could be destroyed, depriving an opponent of the means to make war. Bombing civilians would cause a collapse of morale and a loss of production in the remaining factories. Democracies, where public opinion was allowed, were thought particularly vulnerable. The RAF and the United States Army Air Corps (USAAC) adopted much of this apocalyptic thinking. The policy of RAF Bomber Command became an attempt to achieve victory through the destruction of civilian will, communications and industry. 
The Luftwaffe took a cautious view of strategic bombing and OKL did not oppose the strategic bombardment of industries or cities. It believed it could greatly affect the balance of power on the battlefield by disrupting production and damaging civilian morale. OKL did not believe air power alone could be decisive and the Luftwaffe did not adopt an official policy of the deliberate bombing of civilians until 1942. 
The vital industries and transport centres that would be targeted for shutdown were valid military targets. It could be claimed civilians were not to be targeted directly, but the breakdown of production would affect their morale and will to fight. German legal scholars of the 1930s carefully worked out guidelines for what type of bombing was permissible under international law. While direct attacks against civilians were ruled out as "terror bombing", the concept of attacking vital war industries—and probable heavy civilian casualties and breakdown of civilian morale—was ruled as acceptable. 
From the beginning of the National Socialist regime until 1939, there was a debate in German military journals over the role of strategic bombardment, with some contributors arguing along the lines of the British and Americans.  General Walther Wever (Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff 1 March 1935 – 3 June 1936) championed strategic bombing and the building of suitable aircraft, although he emphasised the importance of aviation in operational and tactical terms. Wever outlined five points of air strategy:
- To destroy the enemy air force by bombing its bases and aircraft factories and defeat enemy air forces attacking German targets.
- To prevent the movement of large enemy ground forces to the decisive areas, by destroying railways and roads, particularly bridges and tunnels, which are indispensable for the movement and supply of forces
- To support the operations of the army formations, independent of railways, i.e., armoured forces and motorised forces, by impeding the enemy's advance and participating directly in ground operations.
- To support naval operations by attacking naval bases, protecting German naval bases and participating directly in naval battles
- To paralyse the enemy armed forces by stopping production in armaments factories. 
Wever argued that OKL should not be solely educated in tactical and operational matters but also in grand strategy, war economics, armament production and the mentality of potential opponents (also known as mirror imaging). Wever's vision was not realised, staff studies in those subjects fell by the wayside and the Air Academies focused on tactics, technology and operational planning, rather than on independent strategic air offensives. 
In 1936, Wever was killed in an air crash and the failure to implement his vision for the new Luftwaffe was largely attributable to his successors. Ex-Army personnel and his successors as Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff, Albert Kesselring (3 June 1936 – 31 May 1937) and Hans-Jürgen Stumpff (1 June 1937 – 31 January 1939) are usually blamed for abandoning strategic planning for close air support. Two prominent enthusiasts for ground-support operations (direct or indirect) were Hugo Sperrle the commander of Luftflotte 3 (1 February 1939 – 23 August 1944) and Hans Jeschonnek (Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff from 1 February 1939 – 19 August 1943). The Luftwaffe was not pressed into ground support operations because of pressure from the army or because it was led by ex-soldiers, the Luftwaffe favoured a model of joint inter-service operations, rather than independent strategic air campaigns. 
Hitler, Göring and air power Edit
Hitler paid less attention to the bombing of opponents than air defence, although he promoted the development of a bomber force in the 1930s and understood it was possible to use bombers for strategic purposes. He told OKL in 1939, that ruthless employment of the Luftwaffe against the heart of the British will to resist would follow when the moment was right. Hitler quickly developed scepticism toward strategic bombing, confirmed by the results of the Blitz. He frequently complained of the Luftwaffe ' s inability to damage industries sufficiently, saying, "The munitions industry cannot be interfered with effectively by air raids . usually, the prescribed targets are not hit". 
While the war was being planned, Hitler never insisted upon the Luftwaffe planning a strategic bombing campaign and did not even give ample warning to the air staff, that war with Britain or even Russia was a possibility. The amount of firm operational and tactical preparation for a bombing campaign was minimal, largely because of the failure by Hitler as supreme commander to insist upon such a commitment. 
Ultimately, Hitler was trapped within his own vision of bombing as a terror weapon, formed in the 1930s when he threatened smaller nations into accepting German rule rather than submit to air bombardment. This fact had important implications. It showed the extent to which Hitler personally mistook Allied strategy for one of morale breaking instead of one of economic warfare, with the collapse of morale as an additional bonus.  Hitler was much more attracted to the political aspects of bombing. As the mere threat of it had produced diplomatic results in the 1930s, he expected that the threat of German retaliation would persuade the Allies to adopt a policy of moderation and not to begin a policy of unrestricted bombing. His hope was—for reasons of political prestige within Germany itself—that the German population would be protected from the Allied bombings. When this proved impossible, he began to fear that popular feeling would turn against his regime, and he redoubled efforts to mount a similar "terror offensive" against Britain in order to produce a stalemate in which both sides would hesitate to use bombing at all. 
A major problem in the managing of the Luftwaffe was Göring Hitler believed the Luftwaffe was "the most effective strategic weapon", and in reply to repeated requests from the Kriegsmarine for control over aircraft insisted, "We should never have been able to hold our own in this war if we had not had an undivided Luftwaffe."  Such principles made it much harder to integrate the air force into the overall strategy and produced in Göring a jealous and damaging defence of his "empire" while removing Hitler voluntarily from the systematic direction of the Luftwaffe at either the strategic or operational level. When Hitler tried to intervene more in the running of the air force later in the war, he was faced with a political conflict of his own making between himself and Göring, which was not fully resolved until the war was almost over.  In 1940 and 1941, Göring's refusal to co-operate with the Kriegsmarine denied the entire Wehrmacht military forces of the Reich the chance to strangle British sea communications, which might have had a strategic or decisive effect in the war against the British Empire. 
The deliberate separation of the Luftwaffe from the rest of the military structure encouraged the emergence of a major "communications gap" between Hitler and the Luftwaffe, which other factors helped to exacerbate. For one thing, Göring's fear of Hitler led him to falsify or misrepresent what information was available in the direction of an uncritical and over-optimistic interpretation of air strength. When Göring decided against continuing Wever's original heavy bomber programme in 1937, the Reichsmarschall's own explanation was that Hitler wanted to know only how many bombers there were, not how many engines each had. In July 1939, Göring arranged a display of the Luftwaffe ' s most advanced equipment at Rechlin, to give the impression the air force was more prepared for a strategic air war than was actually the case. 
Battle of Britain Edit
Although not specifically prepared to conduct independent strategic air operations against an opponent, the Luftwaffe was expected to do so over Britain. From July until September 1940 the Luftwaffe attacked Fighter Command to gain air superiority as a prelude to invasion. This involved the bombing of English Channel convoys, ports, and RAF airfields and supporting industries. Destroying RAF Fighter Command would allow the Germans to gain control of the skies over the invasion area. It was supposed Bomber Command, Coastal Command, and the Royal Navy could not operate under conditions of German air superiority. 
The Luftwaffe's poor intelligence meant that their aircraft were not always able to locate their targets, and thus attacks on factories and airfields failed to achieve the desired results. British fighter aircraft production continued at a rate surpassing Germany's by 2 to 1.  The British produced 10,000 aircraft in 1940, in comparison to Germany's 8,000.  The replacement of pilots and aircrew was more difficult. Both the RAF and Luftwaffe struggled to replace manpower losses, though the Germans had larger reserves of trained aircrew. The circumstances affected the Germans more than the British. Operating over home territory, British aircrew could fly again if they survived being shot down. German crews, even if they survived, faced capture. Moreover, bombers had four to five crewmen on board, representing a greater loss of manpower.  On 7 September, the Germans shifted away from the destruction of the RAF's supporting structures. German intelligence suggested Fighter Command was weakening, and an attack on London would force it into a final battle of annihilation while compelling the British Government to surrender. 
The decision to change strategy is sometimes claimed as a major mistake by OKL. It is argued that persisting with attacks on RAF airfields might have won air superiority for the Luftwaffe.  Others argue that the Luftwaffe made little impression on Fighter Command in the last week of August and first week of September and that the shift in strategy was not decisive.  It has also been argued that it was doubtful the Luftwaffe could have won air superiority before the "weather window" began to deteriorate in October.   It was also possible, if RAF losses became severe, that they could pull out to the north, wait for the German invasion, then redeploy southward again.  Other historians argue that the outcome of the air battle was irrelevant the massive numerical superiority of British naval forces and the inherent weakness of the Kriegsmarine would have made the projected German invasion, Unternehmen Seelöwe (Operation Sea Lion), a disaster with or without German air superiority. 
Change in strategy Edit
Regardless of the ability of the Luftwaffe to win air superiority, Hitler was frustrated it was not happening quickly enough. With no sign of the RAF weakening and the Luftflotten suffering many losses, OKL was keen for a change in strategy. To reduce losses further, strategy changed to prefer night raids, giving the bombers greater protection under cover of darkness.  [a]
It was decided to focus on bombing Britain's industrial cities, in daylight to begin with. The main focus was London. The first major raid took place on 7 September. On 15 September, on a date known as Battle of Britain Day, a large-scale raid was launched in daylight, but suffered significant loss for no lasting gain. Although there were a few large air battles fought in daylight later in the month and into October, the Luftwaffe switched its main effort to night attacks. This became official policy on 7 October. The air campaign soon got underway against London and other British cities. However, the Luftwaffe faced limitations. Its aircraft—Dornier Do 17, Junkers Ju 88, and Heinkel He 111s—were capable of carrying out strategic missions  but were incapable of doing greater damage because of their small bomb-loads.  The Luftwaffe ' s decision in the interwar period to concentrate on medium bombers can be attributed to several reasons: Hitler did not intend or foresee a war with Britain in 1939 OKL believed a medium bomber could carry out strategic missions just as well as a heavy bomber force and Germany did not possess the resources or technical ability to produce four-engined bombers before the war. 
Although it had equipment capable of doing serious damage, the Luftwaffe had unclear strategy and poor intelligence. OKL had not been informed that Britain was to be considered a potential opponent until early 1938. It had no time to gather reliable intelligence on Britain's industries. Moreover, OKL could not settle on an appropriate strategy. German planners had to decide whether the Luftwaffe should deliver the weight of its attacks against a specific segment of British industry such as aircraft factories, or against a system of interrelated industries such as Britain's import and distribution network, or even in a blow aimed at breaking the morale of the British population.  The Luftwaffe ' s strategy became increasingly aimless over the winter of 1940–1941.  Disputes among OKL staff revolved more around tactics than strategy.  This method condemned the offensive over Britain to failure before it began. 
In an operational capacity, limitations in weapons technology and quick British reactions were making it more difficult to achieve strategic effect. Attacking ports, shipping and imports as well as disrupting rail traffic in the surrounding areas, especially the distribution of coal, an important fuel in all industrial economies of the Second World War, would net a positive result. However, the use of delayed-action bombs, while initially very effective, gradually had less impact, partly because they failed to detonate. [b] The British had anticipated the change in strategy and dispersed its production facilities, making them less vulnerable to a concentrated attack. Regional commissioners were given plenipotentiary powers to restore communications and organise the distribution of supplies to keep the war economy moving. 
Pre-war preparations and fears Edit
London had nine million people—a fifth of the British population—living in an area of 750 square miles (1,940 square kilometres), which was difficult to defend because of its size.  Based on experience with German strategic bombing during World War I against the United Kingdom, the British government estimated after the First World War that 50 casualties—with about one-third killed—would result for every tonne of bombs dropped on London. The estimate of tonnes of bombs an enemy could drop per day grew as aircraft technology advanced, from 75 in 1922, to 150 in 1934, to 644 in 1937. That year the Committee on Imperial Defence estimated that an attack of 60 days would result in 600,000 dead and 1.2 million wounded. News reports of the Spanish Civil War, such as the bombing of Barcelona, supported the 50-casualties-per-tonne estimate. By 1938, experts generally expected that Germany would try to drop as much as 3,500 tonnes in the first 24 hours of war and average 700 tonnes a day for several weeks. In addition to high-explosive and incendiary bombs, the Germans could use poison gas and even bacteriological warfare, all with a high degree of accuracy.  In 1939 military theorist Basil Liddell-Hart predicted that 250,000 deaths and injuries in Britain could occur in the first week of war.  London hospitals prepared for 300,000 casualties in the first week of war. 
British air raid sirens sounded for the first time 22 minutes after Neville Chamberlain declared war on Germany. Although bombing attacks unexpectedly did not begin immediately during the Phoney War,  civilians were aware of the deadly power of aerial attacks through newsreels of Barcelona, the Bombing of Guernica and the Bombing of Shanghai. Many popular works of fiction during the 1920s and 1930s portrayed aerial bombing, such as H. G. Wells' novel The Shape of Things to Come and its 1936 film adaptation, and others such as The Air War of 1936 and The Poison War. Harold Macmillan wrote in 1956 that he and others around him "thought of air warfare in 1938 rather as people think of nuclear war today". 
Based in part on the experience of German bombing in the First World War, politicians feared mass psychological trauma from aerial attacks and the collapse of civil society. In 1938, a committee of psychiatrists predicted three times as many mental as physical casualties from aerial bombing, implying three to four million psychiatric patients.  Winston Churchill told Parliament in 1934, "We must expect that, under the pressure of continuous attack upon London, at least three or four million people would be driven out into the open country around the metropolis".  Panic during the Munich crisis, such as the migration by 150,000 people to Wales, contributed to fear of social chaos. 
The government planned the evacuation of four million people—mostly women and children—from urban areas, including 1.4 million from London. It expected about 90% of evacuees to stay in private homes, conducted an extensive survey to determine the amount of space available and made detailed preparations for transporting evacuees. A trial blackout was held on 10 August 1939 and when Germany invaded Poland on 1 September, a blackout began at sunset. Lights were not allowed after dark for almost six years and the blackout became by far the most unpopular aspect of the war for civilians, even more than rationing.  The relocation of the government and the civil service was also planned but would only have occurred if necessary so as not to damage civilian morale. 
Much civil-defence preparation in the form of shelters was left in the hands of local authorities and many areas such as Birmingham, Coventry, Belfast and the East End of London did not have enough shelters.  The unexpected delay to civilian bombing during the Phoney War meant that the shelter programme finished in June 1940, before the Blitz.  The programme favoured backyard Anderson shelters and small brick surface shelters many of the latter were abandoned in 1940 as unsafe. Authorities expected that the raids would be brief and in daylight, rather than attacks by night, which forced Londoners to sleep in shelters. 
Communal shelters Edit
Deep shelters provided most protection against a direct hit. The government did not build them for large populations before the war because of cost, time to build and fears that their safety would cause occupants to refuse to leave to return to work or that anti-war sentiment would develop in large congregations of civilians. The government saw the leading role taken by the Communist Party in advocating the building of deep shelters as an attempt to damage civilian morale, especially after the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact of August 1939.  
The most important existing communal shelters were the London Underground stations. Although many civilians had used them for shelter during the First World War, the government in 1939 refused to allow the stations to be used as shelters so as not to interfere with commuter and troop travel and the fears that occupants might refuse to leave. Underground officials were ordered to lock station entrances during raids but by the second week of heavy bombing, the government relented and ordered the stations to be opened. Each day orderly lines of people queued until 4:00 pm, when they were allowed to enter the stations. In mid-September 1940, about 150,000 people a night slept in the Underground, although by winter and spring the numbers declined to 100,000 or less. Battle noises were muffled and sleep was easier in the deepest stations but many people were killed from direct hits on stations.  In March 1943, 173 men, women and children were crushed to death at Bethnal Green tube station in a crowd surge after a woman fell down the steps as she entered the station. 
Communal shelters never housed more than one seventh of Greater London residents.  Peak use of the Underground as shelter was 177,000 on 27 September 1940 and a November 1940 census of London, found that about 4% of residents used the Tube and other large shelters, 9% in public surface shelters and 27% in private home shelters, implying that the remaining 60% of the city stayed at home.   The government distributed Anderson shelters until 1941 and that year began distributing the Morrison shelter, which could be used inside homes. 
Public demand caused the government in October 1940 to build new deep shelters within the Underground to hold 80,000 people but the period of heaviest bombing had passed before they were finished.  By the end of 1940 improvements had been made in the Underground and in many other large shelters. Authorities provided stoves and bathrooms and canteen trains provided food. Tickets were issued for bunks in large shelters, to reduce the amount of time spent queuing. Committees quickly formed within shelters as informal governments, and organisations such as the British Red Cross and the Salvation Army worked to improve conditions. Entertainment included concerts, films, plays and books from local libraries. 
Although only a small number of Londoners used the mass shelters, when journalists, celebrities and foreigners visited they became part of the Beveridge Report, part of a national debate on social and class division. Most residents found that such divisions continued within the shelters and many arguments and fights occurred over noise, space and other matters. Anti-Jewish sentiment was reported, particularly around the East End of London, with anti-Semitic graffiti and anti-Semitic rumours, such as that Jewish people were "hogging" air raid shelters.  Contrary to pre-war fears of anti-Semitic violence in the East End, one observer found that the "Cockney and the Jew [worked] together, against the Indian". 
"Blitz Spirit" Edit
Although the intensity of the bombing was not as great as pre-war expectations so an equal comparison is impossible, no psychiatric crisis occurred because of the Blitz even during the period of greatest bombing of September 1940. An American witness wrote "By every test and measure I am able to apply, these people are staunch to the bone and won't quit . the British are stronger and in a better position than they were at its beginning". People referred to raids as if they were weather, stating that a day was "very blitzy". 
According to Anna Freud and Edward Glover, London civilians surprisingly did not suffer from widespread shell shock, unlike the soldiers in the Dunkirk evacuation.  The psychoanalysts were correct, and the special network of psychiatric clinics opened to receive mental casualties of the attacks closed due to lack of need. Although the stress of the war resulted in many anxiety attacks, eating disorders, fatigue, weeping, miscarriages, and other physical and mental ailments, society did not collapse. The number of suicides and drunkenness declined, and London recorded only about two cases of "bomb neurosis" per week in the first three months of bombing. Many civilians found that the best way to retain mental stability was to be with family, and after the first few weeks of bombing, avoidance of the evacuation programmes grew.   
The cheerful crowds visiting bomb sites were so large they interfered with rescue work,  pub visits increased in number (beer was never rationed), and 13,000 attended cricket at Lord's. People left shelters when told instead of refusing to leave, although many housewives reportedly enjoyed the break from housework. Some people even told government surveyors that they enjoyed air raids if they occurred occasionally, perhaps once a week. Despite the attacks, defeat in Norway and France, and the threat of invasion, overall morale remained high a Gallup poll found only 3% of Britons expected to lose the war in May 1940, another found an 88% approval rating for Churchill in July, and a third found 89% support for his leadership in October. Support for peace negotiations declined from 29% in February. Each setback caused more civilians to volunteer to become unpaid Local Defence Volunteers, workers worked longer shifts and over weekends, contributions rose to the £5,000 "Spitfire Funds" to build fighters and the number of work days lost to strikes in 1940 was the lowest in history. 
Civilian mobilisation Edit
Civilians of London played an enormous role in protecting their city. Many civilians who were unwilling or unable to join the military joined the Home Guard, the Air Raid Precautions service (ARP), the Auxiliary Fire Service and many other civilian organisations the AFS had 138,000 personnel by July 1939. Only one year earlier, there had only been 6,600 full-time and 13,800 part-time firemen in the entire country.  Before the war, civilians were issued with 50 million respirators (gas masks) in case bombardment with gas began before evacuation.  During the Blitz, The Scout Association guided fire engines to where they were most needed and became known as the "Blitz Scouts". Many unemployed people were drafted into the Royal Army Pay Corps and with the Pioneer Corps, were tasked with salvaging and clean-up.  The Women's Voluntary Services for Civil Defence (WVS) was established in 1938 by the Home Secretary, Samuel Hoare, who considered it the female branch of the ARP.  The WVS organised the evacuation of children, established centres for those displaced by bombing and operated canteens, salvage and recycling schemes. By the end of 1941, the WVS had one million members. 
Pre-war dire predictions of mass air-raid neurosis were not borne out. Predictions had underestimated civilian adaptability and resourcefulness also there were many new civil defence roles that gave a sense of fighting back rather than despair. Official histories concluded that the mental health of a nation may have improved, while panic was rare. 
British air doctrine, since Hugh Trenchard had commanded the Royal Flying Corps (1915–1917), stressed offence as the best means of defence,  which became known as the cult of the offensive. To prevent German formations from hitting targets in Britain, Bomber Command would destroy Luftwaffe aircraft on their bases, aircraft in their factories and fuel reserves by attacking oil plants. This philosophy proved impractical, as Bomber Command lacked the technology and equipment for mass night operations, since resources were diverted to Fighter Command in the mid-1930s and it took until 1943 to catch up. Dowding agreed air defence would require some offensive action and that fighters could not defend Britain alone.  Until September 1939, the RAF lacked specialist night-fighting aircraft and relied on anti-aircraft units, which were poorly equipped and lacking in numbers. 
The attitude of the Air Ministry was in contrast to the experiences of the First World War when German bombers caused physical and psychological damage out of all proportion to their numbers. Around 280 short tons (250 t) (9,000 bombs) had been dropped, killing 1,413 people and injuring 3,500 more. Many people over 35 remembered the bombing and were afraid of more. From 1916 to 1918, German raids had diminished against countermeasures which demonstrated defence against night air raids was possible.  Although night air defence was causing greater concern before the war, it was not at the forefront of RAF planning after 1935, when funds were directed into the new ground-based radar day fighter interception system. The difficulty of RAF bombers in night navigation and target finding led the British to believe that it would be the same for German bomber crews. There was also a mentality in all air forces that flying by day would obviate the need for night operations and their inherent disadvantages. 
Hugh Dowding, Air Officer Commanding Fighter Command, defeated the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain, but preparing day fighter defences left little for night air defence. When the Luftwaffe struck at British cities for the first time on 7 September 1940, a number of civic and political leaders were worried by Dowding's apparent lack of reaction to the new crisis.  Dowding accepted that as AOC, he was responsible for the day and night defence of Britain but seemed reluctant to act quickly and his critics in the Air Staff felt that this was due to his stubborn nature. Dowding was summoned on 17 October, to explain the poor state of the night defences and the supposed (but ultimately successful) "failure" of his daytime strategy. The Minister of Aircraft Production, Lord Beaverbrook and Churchill distanced themselves. The failure to prepare adequate night air defences was undeniable but it was not the responsibility of the AOC Fighter Command to dictate the disposal of resources. The general neglect of the RAF until the late spurt in 1938, left few resources for night air defence and the Government, through the Air Ministry and other civil and military institutions was responsible for policy. Before the war, the Chamberlain government stated that night defence from air attack should not take up much of the national effort. 
German night navigation devices Edit
Because of the inaccuracy of celestial navigation for night navigation and target finding in a fast-moving aircraft, the Luftwaffe developed radio navigation devices and relied on three systems: Knickebein (Crooked leg), X-Gerät (X-Device), and Y-Gerät (Y-Device). This led the British to develop countermeasures, which became known as the Battle of the Beams.  Bomber crews already had some experience with the Lorenz beam, a commercial blind-landing aid for night or bad weather landings. The Germans adapted the short-range Lorenz system into Knickebein, a 30–33 MHz system, which used two Lorenz beams with much stronger signals. Two aerials at ground stations were rotated so that their beams converged over the target. The German bombers would fly along either beam until they picked up the signal from the other beam. When a continuous sound was heard from the second beam the crew knew they were above the target and dropped their bombs.  
Knickebein was in general use but the X-Gerät (X apparatus) was reserved for specially trained pathfinder crews. X-Gerät receivers were mounted in He 111s, with a radio mast on the fuselage. The system worked on 66–77 MHz, a higher frequency than Knickebein. Ground transmitters sent pulses at a rate of 180 per minute. X-Gerät received and analysed the pulses, giving the pilot visual and aural directions. Three cross-beams intersected the beam along which the He 111 was flying. The first cross-beam alerted the bomb-aimer, who activated a bombing clock when the second cross-beam was reached. When the third cross-beam was reached the bomb aimer activated a third trigger, which stopped the first hand of the clock, with the second hand continuing. When the second hand re-aligned with the first, the bombs were released. The clock mechanism was co-ordinated with the distances of the intersecting beams from the target so the target was directly below when the bombs were released.  
Y-Gerät was an automatic beam-tracking system and the most complex of the three devices, which was operated through autopilot. The pilot flew along an approach beam, monitored by a ground controller. Signals from the station were retransmitted by the bomber's equipment, which allowed the distance the bomber had travelled along the beam to be measured precisely. Direction-finding checks also enabled the controller to keep the pilot on course. The crew would be ordered to drop their bombs either by a code word from the ground controller or at the conclusion of the signal transmissions which would stop. The maximum range of Y-Gerät was similar to the other systems and it was accurate enough on occasion for specific buildings to be hit.  
British countermeasures Edit
In June 1940, a German prisoner of war was overheard boasting that the British would never find the Knickebein, even though it was under their noses. The details of the conversation were passed to an RAF Air Staff technical advisor, Dr. R. V. Jones, who started a search which discovered that Luftwaffe Lorenz receivers were more than blind-landing devices. Jones began a search for German beams Avro Ansons of the Beam Approach Training Development Unit (BATDU) were flown up and down Britain fitted with a 30 MHz receiver. Soon a beam was traced to Derby (which had been mentioned in Luftwaffe transmissions). The first jamming operations were carried out using requisitioned hospital electrocautery machines.  The counter-operations were carried out by British Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) units under Wing Commander Edward Addison, No. 80 Wing RAF. The production of false radio navigation signals by re-transmitting the originals became known as meaconing using masking beacons (meacons).  Up to nine special transmitters directed their signals at the beams in a manner that subtly widened their paths, making it harder for bomber crews to locate targets confidence in the device was diminished by the time the Luftwaffe was ready to conduct big raids. 
German beacons operated on the medium-frequency band and the signals involved a two-letter Morse identifier followed by a lengthy time-lapse which enabled the Luftwaffe crews to determine the signal's bearing. The meacon system involved separate locations for a receiver with a directional aerial and a transmitter. The receipt of the German signal by the receiver was duly passed to the transmitter, the signal to be repeated. The action did not guarantee automatic success. If the German bomber flew closer to its own beam than the meacon then the former signal would come through the stronger on the direction finder. The reverse would apply only if the meacon were closer.  In general, German bombers were likely to get through to their targets without too much difficulty. It was to be some months before an effective night-fighter force would be ready, and anti-aircraft defences only became adequate after the Blitz was over, so ruses were created to lure German bombers away from their targets. Throughout 1940, dummy airfields were prepared, good enough to stand up to skilled observation. An unknown number of bombs fell on these diversionary ("Starfish") targets. 
For industrial areas, fires and lighting were simulated. It was decided to recreate normal residential street lighting, and in non-essential areas, lighting to recreate heavy industrial targets. In those sites, carbon arc lamps were used to simulate flashes at tram overhead wires. Red lamps were used to simulate blast furnaces and locomotive fireboxes. Reflections made by factory skylights were created by placing lights under angled wooden panels.  The use of diversionary techniques such as fires had to be made carefully. The fake fires could only begin when the bombing started over an adjacent target and its effects were brought under control. Too early and the chances of success receded too late and the real conflagration at the target would exceed the diversionary fires. Another innovation was the boiler fire. These units were fed from two adjacent tanks containing oil and water. The oil-fed fires were then injected with water from time to time the flashes produced were similar to those of the German C-250 and C-500 Flammbomben. The hope was that, if it could deceive German bombardiers, it would draw more bombers away from the real target. 
Loge and Seeschlange Edit
The first deliberate air raids on London were mainly aimed at the Port of London, causing severe damage.  Late in the afternoon of 7 September 1940, the Germans began Operation London (Unternehmen Loge) (the codename for London) and Seeschlange (Sea Snake), the air offensives against London and other industrial cities. Loge continued for 57 nights.  A total of 348 bombers and 617 fighters took part in the attack.  
Initially, the change in strategy caught the RAF off-guard and caused extensive damage and civilian casualties. Some 107,400 gross tons of shipping was damaged in the Thames Estuary and 1,600 civilians were casualties.  Of this total around 400 were killed.  The fighting in the air was more intense in daylight. Loge had cost the Luftwaffe 41 aircraft 14 bombers, 16 Messerschmitt Bf 109s, seven Messerschmitt Bf 110s and four reconnaissance aircraft.  Fighter Command lost 23 fighters, with six pilots killed and another seven wounded.  Another 247 bombers from Luftflotte 3 (Air Fleet 3) attacked that night.  On 8 September the Luftwaffe returned 412 people were killed and 747 severely wounded. 
On 9 September the OKL appeared to be backing two strategies. Its round-the-clock bombing of London was an immediate attempt to force the British government to capitulate, but it was also striking at Britain's vital sea communications to achieve a victory through siege. Although the weather was poor, heavy raids took place that afternoon on the London suburbs and the airfield at Farnborough. The day's fighting cost Kesselring and Luftflotte 2 (Air Fleet 2) 24 aircraft, including 13 Bf 109s. Fighter Command lost 17 fighters and six pilots. Over the next few days weather was poor and the next main effort would not be made until 15 September 1940. 
On 15 September the Luftwaffe made two large daylight attacks on London along the Thames Estuary, targeting the docks and rail communications in the city. Its hope was to destroy its targets and draw the RAF into defending them, allowing the Luftwaffe to destroy their fighters in large numbers, thereby achieving air superiority.  Large air battles broke out, lasting for most of the day. The first attack merely damaged the rail network for three days,  and the second attack failed altogether.  The air battle was later commemorated by Battle of Britain Day. The Luftwaffe lost 18 percent of the bombers sent on the operations that day and failed to gain air superiority. 
While Göring was optimistic the Luftwaffe could prevail, Hitler was not. On 17 September he postponed Operation Sea Lion (as it turned out, indefinitely) rather than gamble Germany's newly gained military prestige on a risky cross-Channel operation, particularly in the face of a sceptical Joseph Stalin in the Soviet Union. In the last days of the battle, the bombers became lures in an attempt to draw the RAF into combat with German fighters. But their operations were to no avail the worsening weather and unsustainable attrition in daylight gave the OKL an excuse to switch to night attacks on 7 October.   
On 14 October, the heaviest night attack to date saw 380 German bombers from Luftflotte 3 hit London. Around 200 people were killed and another 2,000 injured. British anti-aircraft defences (General Frederick Alfred Pile) fired 8,326 rounds and shot down only 2 bombers. On 15 October, the bombers returned and about 900 fires were started by the mix of 415 short tons (376 t) of high explosive and 11 short tons (10.0 t) of incendiaries dropped. Five main rail lines were cut in London and rolling stock damaged. 
Loge continued during October. 9,000 short tons (8,200 t) of bombs were dropped that month, about 10 percent in daylight, over 6,000 short tons (5,400 t) on London during the night. Birmingham and Coventry were subject to 500 short tons (450 t) of bombs between them in the last 10 days of October. Liverpool suffered 200 short tons (180 t) of bombs dropped. Hull and Glasgow were attacked but 800 short tons (730 t) of bombs were spread out all over Britain. The Metropolitan-Vickers works in Manchester was hit by 12 short tons (11 t) of bombs. Little tonnage was dropped on Fighter Command airfields Bomber Command airfields were hit instead. 
Luftwaffe policy at this point was primarily to continue progressive attacks on London, chiefly by night attack second, to interfere with production in the vast industrial arms factories of the West Midlands, again chiefly by night attack and third to disrupt plants and factories during the day by means of fighter-bombers. 
Kesselring, commanding Luftflotte 2, was ordered to send 50 sorties per night against London and attack eastern harbours in daylight. Sperrle, commanding Luftflotte 3, was ordered to dispatch 250 sorties per night including 100 against the West Midlands. Seeschlange would be carried out by Fliegerkorps X (10th Air Corps) which concentrated on mining operations against shipping. It also took part in the bombing over Britain. By 19/20 April 1941, it had dropped 3,984 mines, 1 ⁄ 3 of the total dropped. The mines' ability to destroy entire streets earned them respect in Britain, but several fell unexploded into British hands allowing counter-measures to be developed which damaged the German anti-shipping campaign. 
By mid-November 1940, when the Germans adopted a changed plan, more than 13,000 short tons (12,000 t) of high explosive and nearly 1,000,000 incendiaries had fallen on London. Outside the capital, there had been widespread harassing activity by single aircraft, as well as fairly strong diversionary attacks on Birmingham, Coventry and Liverpool, but no major raids. The London docks and railways communications had taken a heavy pounding, and much damage had been done to the railway system outside. In September, there had been no less than 667 hits on railways in Great Britain, and at one period, between 5,000 and 6,000 wagons were standing idle from the effect of delayed action bombs. But the great bulk of the traffic went on, and Londoners—though they glanced apprehensively each morning at the list of closed stretches of line displayed at their local station, or made strange detours round back streets in the buses—still got to work. For all the destruction of life and property, the observers sent out by the Ministry of Home Security failed to discover the slightest sign of a break in morale. More than 13,000 civilians had been killed, and almost 20,000 injured, in September and October alone,  but the death toll was much less than expected. In late 1940, Churchill credited the shelters. 
Wartime observers perceived the bombing as indiscriminate. American observer Ralph Ingersoll reported the bombing was inaccurate and did not hit targets of military value, but destroyed the surrounding areas. Ingersol wrote that Battersea Power Station, one of the largest landmarks in London, received only a minor hit.  In fact, on 8 September 1940 both Battersea and West Ham Power Station were both shut down after the 7 September daylight attack on London.  In the case of Battersea power station, an unused extension was hit and destroyed during November but the station was not put out of action during the night attacks.  It is not clear whether the power station or any specific structure was targeted during the German offensive as the Luftwaffe could not accurately bomb select targets during night operations.  In the initial operations against London, it did appear as if rail targets and the bridges over the Thames had been singled out: Victoria Station was hit by four bombs and suffered extensive damage.  The bombing disrupted rail traffic through London without destroying any of the crossings.  On 7 November, St Pancras, Kensal and Bricklayers Arms stations were hit and several lines of Southern Rail were cut on 10 November. The British government grew anxious about the delays and disruption of supplies during the month. Reports suggested the attacks blocked the movement of coal to the Greater London regions and urgent repairs were required.  Attacks against East End docks were effective and many Thames barges were destroyed. The London Underground rail system was also affected high explosive bombs damaged the tunnels rendering some unsafe.  The London Docklands, in particular, the Royal Victoria Dock, received many hits and Port of London trade was disrupted. In some cases, the concentration of the bombing and resulting conflagration created firestorms of 1,000 °C.  The Ministry of Home Security reported that although the damage caused was "serious" it was not "crippling" and the quays, basins, railways and equipment remained operational. 
Improvements in British defences Edit
British night air defences were in a poor state.  Few anti-aircraft guns had fire-control systems, and the underpowered searchlights were usually ineffective against aircraft at altitudes above 12,000 ft (3,700 m).   In July 1940, only 1,200 heavy and 549 light guns were deployed in the whole of Britain. Of the "heavies", some 200 were of the obsolescent 3 in (76 mm) type the remainder were the effective 4.5 in (110 mm) and 3.7 in (94 mm) guns, with a theoretical "ceiling"' of over 30,000 ft (9,100 m) but a practical limit of 25,000 ft (7,600 m) because the predictor in use could not accept greater heights. The light guns, about half of which were of the excellent Bofors 40 mm, dealt with aircraft only up to 6,000 ft (1,800 m).  Although the use of the guns improved civilian morale, with the knowledge the German bomber crews were facing the barrage, it is now believed that the anti-aircraft guns achieved little and in fact the falling shell fragments caused more British casualties on the ground. 
Few fighter aircraft were able to operate at night. Ground-based radar was limited, and airborne radar and RAF night fighters were generally ineffective.  RAF day fighters were converting to night operations and the interim Bristol Blenheim night fighter conversion of the light bomber was being replaced by the powerful Beaufighter, but this was only available in very small numbers.  By the second month of the Blitz the defences were not performing well.  London's defences were rapidly reorganised by General Pile, the Commander-in-Chief of Anti-Aircraft Command. The difference this made to the effectiveness of air defences is questionable. The British were still one-third below the establishment of heavy anti-aircraft artillery AAA (or ack-ack) in May 1941, with only 2,631 weapons available. Dowding had to rely on night fighters. From 1940 to 1941, the most successful night-fighter was the Boulton Paul Defiant its four squadrons shot down more enemy aircraft than any other type.  AA defences improved by better use of radar and searchlights. Over several months, the 20,000 shells spent per raider shot down in September 1940, was reduced to 4,087 in January 1941 and to 2,963 shells in February 1941. 
Airborne Interception radar (AI) was unreliable. The heavy fighting in the Battle of Britain had eaten up most of Fighter Command's resources, so there was little investment in night fighting. Bombers were flown with airborne search lights out of desperation but to little avail. Of greater potential was the GL (Gunlaying) radar and searchlights with fighter direction from RAF fighter control rooms to begin a GCI system (Ground Control-led Interception) under Group-level control (No. 10 Group RAF, No. 11 Group RAF and No. 12 Group RAF).  Whitehall's disquiet at the failures of the RAF led to the replacement of Dowding (who was already due for retirement) with Sholto Douglas on 25 November. Douglas set about introducing more squadrons and dispersing the few GL sets to create a carpet effect in the southern counties. Still, in February 1941, there remained only seven squadrons with 87 pilots, under half the required strength. The GL carpet was supported by six GCI sets controlling radar-equipped night-fighters. By the height of the Blitz, they were becoming more successful. The number of contacts and combats rose in 1941, from 44 and two in 48 sorties in January 1941, to 204 and 74 in May (643 sorties). But even in May, 67 percent of the sorties were visual cat's-eye missions. Curiously, while 43 percent of the contacts in May 1941 were by visual sightings, they accounted for 61 percent of the combats. Yet when compared with Luftwaffe daylight operations, there was a sharp decline in German losses to one percent. If a vigilant bomber crew could spot the fighter first, they had a decent chance of evading it. 
Nevertheless, it was radar that proved to be the critical weapon in the night battles over Britain from this point onward. Dowding had introduced the concept of airborne radar and encouraged its usage. Eventually, it would become a success. On the night of 22/23 July, 1940, Flying Officer Cyril Ashfield (pilot), Pilot Officer Geoffrey Morris (air observer) and Flight Sergeant Reginald Leyland (Air Intercept radar operator) of the Fighter Interception Unit became the first pilot and crew to intercept and destroy an enemy aircraft using onboard radar to guide them to a visual interception, when their AI night fighter brought down a Do 17 off Sussex.  On 19 November 1940 the famous RAF night fighter ace John Cunningham shot down a Ju 88 bomber using airborne radar, just as Dowding had predicted.  By mid-November, nine squadrons were available, but only one was equipped with Beaufighters (No. 219 Squadron RAF at RAF Kenley). By 16 February 1941, this had grown to 12 with 5 equipped, or partially equipped with Beaufighters spread over 5 Groups. 
Night attacks Edit
From November 1940 to February 1941, the Luftwaffe shifted its strategy and attacked other industrial cities.  In particular, the West Midlands were targeted. On the night of 13/14 November, 77 He 111s of Kampfgeschwader 26 (26th Bomber Wing, or KG 26) bombed London while 63 from KG 55 hit Birmingham. The next night, a large force hit Coventry. "Pathfinders" from 12 Kampfgruppe 100 (Bomb Group 100 or KGr 100) led 437 bombers from KG 1, KG 3, KG 26, KG 27, KG 55 and Lehrgeschwader 1 (1st Training Wing, or LG 1) which dropped 394 short tons (357 t) of high explosive, 56 short tons (51 t) of incendiaries, and 127 parachute mines.  Other sources say 449 bombers and a total of 530 short tons (480 t) of bombs were dropped.  The raid against Coventry was particularly devastating, and led to widespread use of the phrase "to coventrate".  Over 10,000 incendiaries were dropped.  Around 21 factories were seriously damaged in Coventry, and loss of public utilities stopped work at nine others, disrupting industrial output for several months. Only one bomber was lost, to anti-aircraft fire, despite the RAF flying 125-night sorties. No follow-up raids were made, as OKL underestimated the British power of recovery (as Bomber Command would do over Germany from 1943 to 1945).  The Germans were surprised by the success of the attack. The concentration had been achieved by accident.  The strategic effect of the raid was a brief 20 percent dip in aircraft production. 
Five nights later, Birmingham was hit by 369 bombers from KG 54, KG 26, and KG 55. By the end of November, 1,100 bombers were available for night raids. An average of 200 were able to strike per night. This weight of attack went on for two months, with the Luftwaffe dropping 13,900 short tons (12,600 t) of bombs.  In November 1940, 6,000 sorties and 23 major attacks (more than 100 tons of bombs dropped) were flown. Two heavy (50 short tons (45 t) of bombs) attacks were also flown. In December, only 11 major and five heavy attacks were made. 
Probably the most devastating attack occurred on the evening of 29 December, when German aircraft attacked the City of London itself with incendiary and high explosive bombs, causing a firestorm that has been called the Second Great Fire of London.  The first group to use these incendiaries was Kampfgruppe 100 which despatched 10 "pathfinder" He 111s. At 18:17, it released the first of 10,000 firebombs, eventually amounting to 300 dropped per minute.  [ failed verification ] Altogether, 130 German bombers destroyed the historical centre of London.  Civilian casualties on London throughout the Blitz amounted to 28,556 killed, and 25,578 wounded. The Luftwaffe had dropped 18,291 short tons (16,593 t) of bombs. 
Not all of the Luftwaffe effort was made against inland cities. Port cities were also attacked to try to disrupt trade and sea communications. In January, Swansea was bombed four times, very heavily. On 17 January around 100 bombers dropped a high concentration of incendiaries, some 32,000 in all. The main damage was inflicted on the commercial and domestic areas. Four days later 230 tons were dropped including 60,000 incendiaries. In Portsmouth Southsea and Gosport waves of 150 bombers destroyed vast swaths of the city with 40,000 incendiaries. Warehouses, rail lines and houses were destroyed and damaged, but the docks were largely untouched.  In January and February 1941, Luftwaffe serviceability rates declined until just 551 of 1,214 bombers were combat-worthy. Seven major and eight heavy attacks were flown, but the weather made it difficult to keep up the pressure. Still, at Southampton, attacks were so effective morale did give way briefly with civilian authorities leading people en masse out of the city. 
Strategic or "terror" bombing Edit
Although official German air doctrine did target civilian morale, it did not espouse the attacking of civilians directly. It hoped to destroy morale by destroying the enemy's factories and public utilities as well as its food stocks (by attacking shipping). Nevertheless, its official opposition to attacks on civilians became an increasingly moot point when large-scale raids were conducted in November and December 1940. Although not encouraged by official policy, the use of mines and incendiaries, for tactical expediency, came close to indiscriminate bombing. Locating targets in skies obscured by industrial haze meant the target area needed to be illuminated and hit "without regard for the civilian population".  Special units, such as KGr 100, became the Beleuchtergruppe (Firelighter Group), which used incendiaries and high explosives to mark the target area. The tactic was expanded into Feuerleitung (Blaze Control) with the creation of Brandbombenfelder (Incendiary Fields) to mark targets. These were marked out by parachute flares. Then bombers carrying SC 1000 (1,000 kg (2,205 lb)), SC 1400 (1,400 kg (3,086 lb)), and SC 1800 (1,800 kg (3,968 lb)) "Satan" bombs were used to level streets and residential areas. By December, the SC 2500 (2,500 kg (5,512 lb)) "Max" bomb was used. 
These decisions, apparently taken at the Luftflotte or Fliegerkorps level, meant attacks on individual targets were gradually replaced by what was, for all intents and purposes, an unrestricted area attack or Terrorangriff (Terror Attack).  Part of the reason for this was inaccuracy of navigation. The effectiveness of British countermeasures against Knickebein, which was designed to avoid area attacks, forced the Luftwaffe to resort to these methods.  The shift from precision bombing to area attack is indicated in the tactical methods and weapons dropped. KGr 100 increased its use of incendiaries from 13 to 28 percent. By December, this had increased to 92 percent.  Use of incendiaries, which were inherently inaccurate, indicated much less care was taken to avoid civilian property close to industrial sites. Other units ceased using parachute flares and opted for explosive target markers.  Captured German aircrews also indicated the homes of industrial workers were deliberately targeted. 
Directive 23: Göring and the Kriegsmarine Edit
In 1941, the Luftwaffe shifted strategy again. Erich Raeder—commander-in-chief of the Kriegsmarine—had long argued the Luftwaffe should support the German submarine force (U-Bootwaffe) in the Battle of the Atlantic by attacking shipping in the Atlantic Ocean and attacking British ports.  Eventually, he convinced Hitler of the need to attack British port facilities.  At Raeder's prompting, Hitler correctly noted that the greatest damage to the British war economy had been done through the destruction of merchant shipping by submarines and air attacks by small numbers of Focke-Wulf Fw 200 naval aircraft and ordered the German air arm to focus its efforts against British convoys. This meant that British coastal centres and shipping at sea west of Ireland were the prime targets. 
Hitler's interest in this strategy forced Göring and Jeschonnek to review the air war against Britain in January 1941. This led to Göring and Jeschonnek agreeing to Hitler's Directive 23, Directions for operations against the British War Economy, which was published on 6 February 1941 and gave aerial interdiction of British imports by sea top priority.  This strategy had been recognised before the war, but Operation Eagle Attack and the following Battle of Britain had got in the way of striking at Britain's sea communications and diverted German air strength to the campaign against the RAF and its supporting structures.  The OKL had always regarded the interdiction of sea communications of less importance than bombing land-based aircraft industries. 
Directive 23 was the only concession made by Göring to the Kriegsmarine over the strategic bombing strategy of the Luftwaffe against Britain. Thereafter, he would refuse to make available any air units to destroy British dockyards, ports, port facilities, or shipping in dock or at sea, lest Kriegsmarine gain control of more Luftwaffe units.  Raeder's successor—Karl Dönitz—would—on the intervention of Hitler—gain control of one unit (KG 40), but Göring would soon regain it. Göring's lack of co-operation was detrimental to the one air strategy with potentially decisive strategic effect on Britain. Instead, he wasted aircraft of Fliegerführer Atlantik (Flying Command Atlantic) on bombing mainland Britain instead of attacks against convoys.  For Göring, his prestige had been damaged by the defeat in the Battle of Britain, and he wanted to regain it by subduing Britain by air power alone. He was always reluctant to co-operate with Raeder. 
Even so, the decision by the OKL to support the strategy in Directive 23 was instigated by two considerations, both of which had little to do with wanting to destroy Britain's sea communications in conjunction with the Kriegsmarine. First, the difficulty in estimating the impact of bombing upon war production was becoming apparent, and second, the conclusion British morale was unlikely to break led the OKL to adopt the naval option.  The indifference displayed by the OKL to Directive 23 was perhaps best demonstrated in operational directives which diluted its effect. They emphasised the core strategic interest was attacking ports but they insisted in maintaining pressure or diverting strength, onto industries building aircraft, anti-aircraft guns, and explosives. Other targets would be considered if the primary ones could not be attacked because of weather conditions. 
A further line in the directive stressed the need to inflict the heaviest losses possible, but also to intensify the air war in order to create the impression an amphibious assault on Britain was planned for 1941. However, meteorological conditions over Britain were not favourable for flying and prevented an escalation in air operations. Airfields became water-logged and the 18 Kampfgruppen (bomber groups) of the Luftwaffe ' s Kampfgeschwadern (bomber wings) were relocated to Germany for rest and re-equipment. 
British ports Edit
From the German point of view, March 1941 saw an improvement. The Luftwaffe flew 4,000 sorties that month, including 12 major and three heavy attacks. The electronic war intensified but the Luftwaffe flew major inland missions only on moonlit nights. Ports were easier to find and made better targets. To confuse the British, radio silence was observed until the bombs fell. X- and Y-Gerät beams were placed over false targets and switched only at the last minute. Rapid frequency changes were introduced for X-Gerät, whose wider band of frequencies and greater tactical flexibility ensured it remained effective at a time when British selective jamming was degrading the effectiveness of Y-Gerät. 
By now, the imminent threat of invasion had all but passed as the Luftwaffe had failed to gain the prerequisite air superiority. The aerial bombing was now principally aimed at the destruction of industrial targets, but also continued with the objective of breaking the morale of the civilian population.  The attacks were focused against western ports in March. These attacks produced some breaks in morale, with civil leaders fleeing the cities before the offensive reached its height. But the Luftwaffe ' s effort eased in the last 10 attacks as seven Kampfgruppen moved to Austria in preparation for the Balkans Campaign in Yugoslavia and Greece. The shortage of bombers caused OKL to improvise.  Some 50 Junkers Ju 87 Stuka dive-bombers and Jabos (fighter-bombers) were used, officially classed as Leichte Kampfflugzeuge ("light bombers") and sometimes called Leichte Kesselringe ("Light Kesselrings"). The defences failed to prevent widespread damage but on some occasions did prevent German bombers concentrating on their targets. On occasion, only one-third of German bombs hit their targets. 
The diversion of heavier bombers to the Balkans meant that the crews and units left behind were asked to fly two or three sorties per night. Bombers were noisy, cold, and vibrated badly. Added to the tension of the mission which exhausted and drained crews, tiredness caught up with and killed many. In one incident on 28/29 April, Peter Stahl of KG 30 was flying on his 50th mission. He fell asleep at the controls of his Ju 88 and woke up to discover the entire crew asleep. He roused them, ensured they took oxygen and Dextro-Energen tablets, then completed the mission. 
The Luftwaffe could still inflict much damage and after the German conquest of Western Europe, the air and submarine offensive against British sea communications became much more dangerous than the German offensive during the First World War. Liverpool and its port became an important destination for convoys heading through the Western Approaches from North America, bringing supplies and materials. The considerable rail network distributed to the rest of the country.  Air attacks sank 39,126 long tons (39,754 t) of shipping, with another 111,601 long tons (113,392 t) damaged. Minister of Home Security Herbert Morrison was also worried morale was breaking, noting the defeatism expressed by civilians.  Other sources point out that half of the 144 berths in the port were rendered unusable and cargo unloading capability was reduced by 75 percent. Roads and railways were blocked and ships could not leave harbour. On 8 May 1941, 57 ships were destroyed, sunk or damaged, amounting to 80,000 long tons (81,000 t). Around 66,000 houses were destroyed and 77,000 people made homeless ("bombed out"  ), with 1,900 people killed and 1,450 seriously hurt on one night.  Operations against London up until May 1941 could also have a severe impact on morale. The populace of the port of Hull became "trekkers", people who made a mass exodus from cities before, during and after attacks.  The Luftwaffe attacks failed to knock out railways or port facilities for long, even in the Port of London, a target of many attacks.  The Port of London, in particular, was an important target, bringing in one-third of overseas trade. 
On 13 March, the upper Clyde port of Clydebank near Glasgow was bombed (Clydebank Blitz). All but seven of its 12,000 houses were damaged. Many more ports were attacked. Plymouth was attacked five times before the end of the month while Belfast, Hull, and Cardiff were hit. Cardiff was bombed on three nights Portsmouth centre was devastated by five raids. The rate of civilian housing loss was averaging 40,000 people per week dehoused in September 1940. In March 1941, two raids on Plymouth and London dehoused 148,000 people.  Still, while heavily damaged, British ports continued to support war industry and supplies from North America continued to pass through them while the Royal Navy continued to operate in Plymouth, Southampton, and Portsmouth.   Plymouth in particular, because of its vulnerable position on the south coast and close proximity to German air bases, was subjected to the heaviest attacks. On 10/11 March, 240 bombers dropped 193 tons of high explosives and 46,000 incendiaries. Many houses and commercial centres were heavily damaged, the electrical supply was knocked out, and five oil tanks and two magazines exploded. Nine days later, two waves of 125 and 170 bombers dropped heavy bombs, including 160 tons of high explosive and 32,000 incendiaries. Much of the city centre was destroyed. Damage was inflicted on the port installations, but many bombs fell on the city itself. On 17 April 346 tons of explosives and 46,000 incendiaries were dropped from 250 bombers led by KG 26. The damage was considerable, and the Germans also used aerial mines. Over 2,000 AAA shells were fired, destroying two Ju 88s.  By the end of the air campaign over Britain, only eight percent of the German effort against British ports was made using mines. 
In the north, substantial efforts were made against Newcastle-upon-Tyne and Sunderland, which were large ports on the English east coast. On 9 April 1941 Luftflotte 2 dropped 150 tons of high explosives and 50,000 incendiaries from 120 bombers in a five-hour attack. Sewer, rail, docklands, and electric installations were damaged. In Sunderland on 25 April, Luftflotte 2 sent 60 bombers which dropped 80 tons of high explosive and 9,000 incendiaries. Much damage was done. A further attack on the Clyde, this time at Greenock, took place on 6 and 7 May. However, as with the attacks in the south, the Germans failed to prevent maritime movements or cripple industry in the regions. 
The last major attack on London was on 10/11 May 1941, on which the Luftwaffe flew 571 sorties and dropped 800 tonnes of bombs. This caused more than 2,000 fires 1,436 people were killed and 1,792 seriously injured, which affected morale badly.  Another raid was carried out on 11/12 May 1941.  Westminster Abbey and the Law Courts were damaged, while the Chamber of the House of Commons was destroyed. One-third of London's streets were impassable. All but one railway station line was blocked for several weeks.  This raid was significant, as 63 German fighters were sent with the bombers, indicating the growing effectiveness of RAF night fighter defences. 
RAF night fighters Edit
German air supremacy at night was also now under threat. British night-fighter operations out over the Channel were proving successful.  This was not immediately apparent.  The Bristol Blenheim F.1 carried four .303 in (7.7 mm) machine guns which lacked the firepower to easily shoot down a Do 17, Ju 88 or Heinkel He 111.  The Blenheim had only a small speed advantage to overhaul a German bomber in a stern-chase. Added to the fact an interception relied on visual sighting, a kill was most unlikely even in the conditions of a moonlit sky.  The Boulton Paul Defiant, despite its poor performance during daylight engagements, was a much better night fighter. It was faster, able to catch the bombers and its configuration of four machine guns in a turret could (much like German night fighters in 1943–1945 with Schräge Musik) engage the German bomber from beneath. Attacks from below offered a larger target, compared to attacking tail-on, as well as a better chance of not being seen by the crew (so less chance of evasion), as well as greater likelihood of detonating its bomb load. In subsequent months a steady number of German bombers would fall to night fighters. 
Improved aircraft designs were in the offing with the Bristol Beaufighter, then under development. It would prove formidable but its development was slow.  The Beaufighter had a maximum speed of 320 mph (510 km/h), an operational ceiling of 26,000 ft (7,900 m), a climb rate of 2,500 ft (760 m) per minute and its battery of four 20 mm (0.79 in) Hispano cannon and six .303 in Browning machine guns was much more lethal.  On 19 November, John Cunningham of No. 604 Squadron RAF shot down a bomber flying an AI-equipped Beaufighter, the first air victory for the airborne radar.  In November and December 1940, the Luftwaffe flew 9,000 sorties against British targets and RAF night fighters claimed only six shot down. In January 1941, Fighter Command flew 486 sorties against 1,965 made by the Germans. Just three and twelve were claimed by the RAF and AA defences respectively.  In the bad weather of February 1941, Fighter Command flew 568 sorties to counter the Luftwaffe which flew 1,644 sorties. Night fighters could claim only four bombers for four losses. 
By April and May 1941, the Luftwaffe was still getting through to their targets, taking no more than one- to two-percent losses per mission.  On 19/20 April 1941, in honour of Hitler's 52nd birthday, 712 bombers hit Plymouth with a record 1,000 tons of bombs.  Losses were minimal. In the following month, 22 German bombers were lost with 13 confirmed to have been shot down by night fighters.  On 3/4 May, nine were shot down in one night.  On 10/11 May, London suffered severe damage, but 10 German bombers were downed.  In May 1941, RAF night fighters shot down 38 German bombers.  By the end of May, Kesselring's Luftflotte 2 had been withdrawn, leaving Hugo Sperrle's Luftflotte 3 as a token force to maintain the illusion of strategic bombing.  Hitler now had his sights set on attacking the USSR with Operation Barbarossa, and the Blitz came to an end. 
Luftwaffe losses Edit
Between 20 June 1940, when the first German air operations began over Britain, and 31 March 1941, OKL recorded the loss of 2,265 aircraft over the British Isles, a quarter of them fighters and one-third bombers. At least 3,363 Luftwaffe aircrew were killed, 2,641 missing and 2,117 wounded.  Total losses could have been as high as 600 bombers, just 1.5 percent of the sorties flown. A significant number of the aircraft not shot down after the resort to night bombing were wrecked during landings or crashed in bad weather. 
Effectiveness of bombing Edit
The military effectiveness of bombing varied. The Luftwaffe dropped around 45,000 short tons (41,000 t) of bombs during the Blitz, which disrupted production and transport, reduced food supplies, and shook British morale. The bombing also helped to support the U-boat blockade by sinking some 58,000 long tons (59,000 t) of shipping and damaging 450,000 long tons (460,000 t) more. Despite the bombing, British production rose steadily throughout this period, although there were significant falls during April 1941, probably influenced by the departure of workers for Easter Holidays, according to the British official history. The official history volume British War Production (Postan, 1952) noted that the greatest effect on output of warlike stores was on the supply of components and dispersal of production rather than complete equipment.  
In aircraft production, the British were denied the opportunity to reach the planned target of 2,500 aircraft in a month, arguably the greatest achievement of the bombing, as it forced the dispersal of the industry, at first because of damage to aircraft factories and then by a policy of precautionary dispersal.  In April 1941, when the targets were British ports, rifle production fell by 25 percent, filled-shell production by 4.6 percent and in small-arms production 4.5 percent.  The strategic impact on industrial cities was varied most took from 10 to 15 days to recover from heavy raids, although Belfast and Liverpool took longer. The attacks against Birmingham took war industries some three months to recover fully. The exhausted population took three weeks to overcome the effects of an attack. 
The air offensive against the RAF and British industry failed to have the desired effect. More might have been achieved had OKL exploited the vulnerability of British sea communications. The Allies did so later when Bomber Command attacked rail communications and the United States Army Air Forces targeted oil, but that would have required an economic-industrial analysis of which the Luftwaffe was incapable.  OKL instead sought clusters of targets that suited the latest policy (which changed frequently), and disputes within the leadership were about tactics rather than strategy.  Though militarily ineffective, the Blitz cost around 41,000 lives, may have injured another 139,000 people and did enormous damage to British infrastructure and housing stock. 
RAF evaluation Edit
The British began to assess the impact of the Blitz in August 1941 and the RAF Air Staff used the German experience to improve Bomber Command's offensives. They concluded bombers should strike a single target each night and use more incendiaries because they had a greater impact on production than high explosives. They also noted regional production was severely disrupted when city centres were devastated through the loss of administrative offices, utilities and transport. They believed the Luftwaffe had failed in precision attack and concluded the German example of area attack using incendiaries was the way forward for operations over Germany. 
Some writers claim the Air Staff ignored a critical lesson, that British morale did not break and that attacking German morale was not sufficient to induce a collapse. Aviation strategists dispute that morale was ever a major consideration for Bomber Command. Throughout 1933–39 none of the 16 Western Air Plans drafted mentioned morale as a target. The first three directives in 1940 did not mention civilian populations or morale in any way. Morale was not mentioned until the ninth wartime directive on 21 September 1940.  The 10th directive in October 1940 mentioned morale by name but industrial cities were only to be targeted if weather prevented raids on oil targets. 
The AOC Bomber Command, Arthur Harris, who did see German morale as an objective, did not believe that the morale-collapse could occur without the destruction of the German economy. The primary goal of Bomber Command was to destroy the German industrial base (economic warfare) and in doing so reduce morale. In late 1943, just before the Battle of Berlin, Harris declared the power of Bomber Command would enable it to achieve "a state of devastation in which surrender is inevitable".   A summary of Harris' strategic intentions was clear,
From 1943 to the end of the war, he [Harris] and other proponents of the area offensive represented it [the bomber offensive] less as an attack on morale than as an assault on the housing, utilities, communications, and other services that supported the war production effort.
in comparison to the Allied bombing campaign against Germany, casualties due to the Blitz were relatively low the bombing of Hamburg alone inflicted about 40,000 civilian casualties. 
Popular imagery and propaganda Edit
A popular image arose of British people in the Second World War: a collection of people locked in national solidarity. [ citation needed ] This image entered the historiography of the Second World War in the 1980s and 1990s, [ dubious – discuss ] especially after the publication of Angus Calder's book The Myth of the Blitz (1991). It was evoked by both the right and left political factions in Britain in 1982, during the Falklands War when it was portrayed in a nostalgic narrative in which the Second World War represented patriotism actively and successfully acting as a defender of democracy.   This imagery of people in the Blitz was embedded via being in film, radio, newspapers and magazines.  At the time it was seen as a useful propaganda tool for domestic and foreign consumption.  Historians' critical response to this construction focused on what were seen as over-emphasised claims of patriotic nationalism and national unity. In the Myth of the Blitz, Calder exposed some of the counter-evidences of anti-social and divisive behaviours. What he saw as the myth—serene national unity—became "historical truth". In particular, class division was most evident during the Blitz. 
Raids during the Blitz produced the greatest divisions and morale effects in the working-class areas, with lack of sleep, insufficient shelters and inefficiency of warning systems being major causes. The loss of sleep was a particular factor, with many not bothering to attend inconvenient shelters. The Communist Party made political capital out of these difficulties.  In the wake of the Coventry Blitz, there was widespread agitation from the Communist Party over the need for bomb-proof shelters. Many Londoners, in particular, took to using the Underground railway system, without authority, for shelter and sleeping through the night. So worried were the government over the sudden campaign of leaflets and posters distributed by the Communist Party in Coventry and London, that the police were sent to seize their production facilities. The government up until November 1940, was opposed to the centralised organisation of shelter. Home Secretary Sir John Anderson was replaced by Morrison soon afterwards, in the wake of a Cabinet reshuffle as the dying Neville Chamberlain resigned. Morrison warned that he could not counter the Communist unrest unless provision of shelters were made. He recognised the right of the public to seize tube stations and authorised plans to improve their condition and expand them by tunnelling. Still, many British citizens, who had been members of the Labour Party, itself inert over the issue, turned to the Communist Party. The Communists attempted to blame the damage and casualties of the Coventry raid on the rich factory owners, big business and landowning interests and called for a negotiated peace. Though they failed to make a large gain in influence, the membership of the Party had doubled by June 1941.  The "Communist threat" was deemed important enough for Herbert Morrison to order, with the support of the Cabinet, the cessation of activities of the Daily Worker and The Week the Communist newspaper and journal. 
The brief success of the Communists also fed into the hands of the British Union of Fascists (BUF). Anti-Semitic attitudes became widespread, particularly in London. Rumours that Jewish support was underpinning the Communist surge were frequent. Rumours that Jews were inflating prices, were responsible for the Black Market, were the first to panic under attack (even the cause of the panic) and secured the best shelters via underhanded methods, were also widespread. There was also minor ethnic antagonism between the small Black, Indian and Jewish communities, but despite this these tensions quietly and quickly subsided.  In other cities, class divisions became more evident. Over a quarter of London's population had left the city by November 1940. Civilians left for more remote areas of the country. Upsurges in population in south Wales and Gloucester intimated where these displaced people went. Other reasons, including industry dispersal may have been a factor. However, resentment of rich self-evacuees or hostile treatment of poor ones were signs of persistence of class resentments although these factors did not appear to threaten social order.  The total number of evacuees numbered 1.4 million, including a high proportion from the poorest inner-city families. Reception committees were completely unprepared for the condition of some of the children. Far from displaying the nation's unity in times of war, the scheme backfired, often aggravating class antagonism and bolstering prejudice about the urban poor. Within four months, 88 percent of evacuated mothers, 86 percent of small children, and 43 percent of schoolchildren had been returned home. The lack of bombing in the Phoney War contributed significantly to the return of people to the cities, but class conflict was not eased a year later when evacuation operations had to be put into effect again. 
Archive audio recordings Edit
In recent years a large number of wartime recordings relating to the Blitz have been made available on audiobooks such as The Blitz, The Home Front and British War Broadcasting. These collections include period interviews with civilians, servicemen, aircrew, politicians and Civil Defence personnel, as well as Blitz actuality recordings, news bulletins and public information broadcasts. Notable interviews include Thomas Alderson, the first recipient of the George Cross, John Cormack, who survived eight days trapped beneath rubble on Clydeside, and Herbert Morrison's famous "Britain shall not burn" appeal for more fireguards in December 1940. 
Bombsite rubble Edit
In one 6-month period, 750,000 tons of bombsite rubble from London were transported by railway on 1,700 freight trains to make runways on Bomber Command airfields in East Anglia. Bombsite rubble from Birmingham was used to make runways on US Air Force bases in Kent and Essex in southeast England.  Many sites of bombed buildings, when cleared of rubble, were cultivated to grow vegetables to ease wartime food shortages and were known as victory gardens. 
Bombing raid statistics Edit
Below is a table by city of the number of major raids (where at least 100 tons of bombs were dropped) and tonnage of bombs dropped during these major raids. Smaller raids are not included in the tonnages.
Bombing of Ulm in World War II
The city of Ulm, in the German state of Baden-Wurttemberg, was heavily bombed during the closing months of World War II. The first and heaviest raid, on 17 December 1944, left 707 people dead, 613 injured, and 25.000 homeless. Two large truck factories, Magirus-Deutz and Kassbohrer, were the primary targets. There were several other important industries and some Wehrmacht barracks and depots.
Within 25 minutes of the RAID, 317 Avro Lancaster bombers and 13 de Havilland light bombers mosquito for a total of 1.449 tons of bombs, starting in the city center, clock tower, münster and then crawling back to the West in the industrial and Railway areas. The Gallwitz barracks and several military hospitals were among 14 institutions destroyed. The citys historic Cathedral Ulm suffered only minor damage. Lost two Lancasters.
Subsequent raids on 1 March and 19 April 1945, British and American planes, there are only 632 of the dead. By the end of the war, 81% of city centre was destroyed. Only 1.763 12.756 of the building remained intact.
pp. 260 261. Dyson 2006, p. 3. Bombing of Ulm in World War II Neutzner 2010, p. 17. U.S. Army Air Forces in World War II Combat Chronology. March 1945
The Italian bombing of Mandatory Palestine in World War II was part of an effort by the Italian Royal Air Force Regia Aeronautica to strike at the United
bombing during World War II was the sustained aerial attack on railways, harbours, cities, workers and civilian housing, and industrial districts in
During World War II the German city of Heilbronn was bombed numerous times by the British Royal Air Force and the United States Army Air Forces. The
The bombing of Kobe in World War II on March 16 and 17, 1945, was part of the strategic bombing campaign waged by the United States against military and
The Bombing of Numazu in World War II 沼津大空襲, Numazu dai - kūshū was part of the strategic bombing campaign waged by the United States against military
The bombing of Konigsberg was a series of attacks made on the city of Konigsberg in East Prussia during World War II The Soviet Air Force had made several
The Bombing of Kōfu in World War II 甲府空襲, Kōfu kūshū was part of the strategic bombing campaign waged by the United States against military and civilian
The Bombing of Hamamatsu in World War II 浜松空襲, Hamamatsu Kushu was part of the strategic bombing campaign waged by the United States of America against
The Bombing of Shizuoka in World War II 静岡大空襲, Shizuoka dai - kūshū on June 19, 1945, was part of the strategic bombing campaign waged by the United States
The bombing of Podgorica in World War II was carried out by the Allies from 1943 until 1944 at the request of the Yugoslav Partisans. Between the two
Berlin, the capital of Nazi Germany, was subject to 363 air raids during the Second World War It was bombed by the RAF Bomber Command between 1940 and
The bombing of Treviso took place on 7 April 1944, during World War II 159 Boeing B - 17 Flying Fortress of the United States Army Air Force escorted by
The bombing of Rome in World War II took place on several occasions in 1943 and 1944, primarily by Allied and to a smaller degree by Axis aircraft, before
The Bombing of Wurzburg in World War II was part of the strategic bombing campaign by the Allies against Nazi Germany. Wurzburg, a city in Franconia. Although
During World War II the industrial town of Essen, was a target of Allied strategic bombing The Krupp factory was an important industrial target, Essen
The Bombing of Tokokawa in World War II 豊川空襲, Toyokawa dai - kūshū was part of the strategic bombing campaign waged by the United States of America against
The bombing of Augsburg in World War II included two British RAF and one USAAF bombing raids against the German city of Augsburg on 17 April 1942 and
Bucharest World War II bombings were primarily Allied bombings of railroad targets and those of the Oil Campaign of World War II but included a bombing by Nazi
War II Bombing of Treviso in World War II Bombing of Ulm in World War II Bombing of Vienna in World War II Bombing of Warsaw in World War II Bombing of
The Bombing of Nagoya in World War II by the United States Army Air Forces took place as part of the air raids on Japan during the closing months of the
Aviation bombed the Estonian capital Tallinn several times during World War II The first instance was during the Summer War of 1941 part of Operation
World War II the city of Lubeck was the first German city to be attacked in substantial numbers by the Royal Air Force. The attack on the night of 28
first bombing of Dublin in World War II occurred early on the morning of 2 January 1941, when German bombs were dropped on the Terenure area of south
Duisburg was bombed a number of times by the Allies during World War II The most devastating air raids on Duisburg occurred during October 1944 when the
bombing of Zadar Italian: Zara during the Second World War by the Allies lasted from November 1943 to October 1944. Although other large cities in Italy
The bombing of Zagreb in World War II was carried out by the Allies from 1944 until 1945. Over the course of the bombing the areas of Črnomerec, Borongaj
The capital of Finland, Helsinki was bombed repeatedly during World War II Between 1939 1944 Finland was subjected to a number of bombing campaigns by
The Bulgarian capital of Sofia suffered a series of Allied bombing raids during World War II from late 1943 to early 1944. United Kingdom and the United
of the town was destroyed by Allied bombing and all bridges across the Danube to Ulm were destroyed. Rebuilding began, and from the end of World War
- pp. 260 261. Dyson 2006, p. 3. Bombing of Ulm in World War II Neutzner 2010, p. 17. U.S. Army Air Forces in World War II Combat Chronology. March 1945
- The Italian bombing of Mandatory Palestine in World War II was part of an effort by the Italian Royal Air Force Regia Aeronautica to strike at the United
- bombing during World War II was the sustained aerial attack on railways, harbours, cities, workers and civilian housing, and industrial districts in
- During World War II the German city of Heilbronn was bombed numerous times by the British Royal Air Force and the United States Army Air Forces. The
- The bombing of Kobe in World War II on March 16 and 17, 1945, was part of the strategic bombing campaign waged by the United States against military and
- The Bombing of Numazu in World War II 沼津大空襲, Numazu dai - kūshū was part of the strategic bombing campaign waged by the United States against military
- The bombing of Konigsberg was a series of attacks made on the city of Konigsberg in East Prussia during World War II The Soviet Air Force had made several
- The Bombing of Kōfu in World War II 甲府空襲, Kōfu kūshū was part of the strategic bombing campaign waged by the United States against military and civilian
- The Bombing of Hamamatsu in World War II 浜松空襲, Hamamatsu Kushu was part of the strategic bombing campaign waged by the United States of America against
- The Bombing of Shizuoka in World War II 静岡大空襲, Shizuoka dai - kūshū on June 19, 1945, was part of the strategic bombing campaign waged by the United States
- The bombing of Podgorica in World War II was carried out by the Allies from 1943 until 1944 at the request of the Yugoslav Partisans. Between the two
- Berlin, the capital of Nazi Germany, was subject to 363 air raids during the Second World War It was bombed by the RAF Bomber Command between 1940 and
- The bombing of Treviso took place on 7 April 1944, during World War II 159 Boeing B - 17 Flying Fortress of the United States Army Air Force escorted by
- The bombing of Rome in World War II took place on several occasions in 1943 and 1944, primarily by Allied and to a smaller degree by Axis aircraft, before
- The Bombing of Wurzburg in World War II was part of the strategic bombing campaign by the Allies against Nazi Germany. Wurzburg, a city in Franconia. Although
- During World War II the industrial town of Essen, was a target of Allied strategic bombing The Krupp factory was an important industrial target, Essen
- The Bombing of Tokokawa in World War II 豊川空襲, Toyokawa dai - kūshū was part of the strategic bombing campaign waged by the United States of America against
- The bombing of Augsburg in World War II included two British RAF and one USAAF bombing raids against the German city of Augsburg on 17 April 1942 and
- Bucharest World War II bombings were primarily Allied bombings of railroad targets and those of the Oil Campaign of World War II but included a bombing by Nazi
- War II Bombing of Treviso in World War II Bombing of Ulm in World War II Bombing of Vienna in World War II Bombing of Warsaw in World War II Bombing of
- The Bombing of Nagoya in World War II by the United States Army Air Forces took place as part of the air raids on Japan during the closing months of the
- Aviation bombed the Estonian capital Tallinn several times during World War II The first instance was during the Summer War of 1941 part of Operation
- World War II the city of Lubeck was the first German city to be attacked in substantial numbers by the Royal Air Force. The attack on the night of 28
- first bombing of Dublin in World War II occurred early on the morning of 2 January 1941, when German bombs were dropped on the Terenure area of south
- Duisburg was bombed a number of times by the Allies during World War II The most devastating air raids on Duisburg occurred during October 1944 when the
- bombing of Zadar Italian: Zara during the Second World War by the Allies lasted from November 1943 to October 1944. Although other large cities in Italy
- The bombing of Zagreb in World War II was carried out by the Allies from 1944 until 1945. Over the course of the bombing the areas of Črnomerec, Borongaj
- The capital of Finland, Helsinki was bombed repeatedly during World War II Between 1939 1944 Finland was subjected to a number of bombing campaigns by
- The Bulgarian capital of Sofia suffered a series of Allied bombing raids during World War II from late 1943 to early 1944. United Kingdom and the United
- of the town was destroyed by Allied bombing and all bridges across the Danube to Ulm were destroyed. Rebuilding began, and from the end of World War
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Ulm Operations & Codenames of WWII.
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Second world war bomb causes shutdown in central Berlin World.
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Aftershock: The Human Toll of War: Haunting World War II Images.
It survived the Allied bombing of Ulm late in World War II over 80 percent of the city center was destroyed but now is in peril due to peeing. In Color The Cologne Cathedral stands tall amidst the ruins of the. The world was in ruin at the end of World War II: from the Blitz in Londo My heart stopped a bit at the photo of bombed out Ulm, which is where my family is. The War Ends in Europe, 1945 EyeWitness to History. Опубликовано: 7 нояб. 2019 г.
Monday, February 1, 2016, 5:15 PM City Hall Council Chambers.
Cathedral suffered fourteen hits by aerial bombs during World War II. 515 ft tall, second in Europe after Ulm Minster and third in the world. Air Force Combat Units of WWII Air Force Historical Research Agency. On 2 3 Apr 1945, Lubeck was hit by RAF bombers manned by training crews. Eight aircraft had been lost seven during the raid and one so badly damaged that it had to be written off 17 Dec 1944, British bombers attacked Ulm, Germany. Aerial bombing of German cities Hamburg and Dresden by the. Fold3 Black and White and Color Photographs of U.S. Air Force and Predecessor Agencies Activities, Facilities, and Personnel World War II, Publication Title:. Bombing of Hamburg, Dresden, and Other Cities World War II. Posts about ulm written by Hilary Parkinson. 1, 2. 3, 4, 5, 6 7, 8, 9. 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16. 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23. 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30. 31. Ulm – Pieces of History. As a sergeant during World War II in a medical company of the Air Force. Goring, Bormann visit Wolfs Lair after the bomb attack of July 20, 1944 of the Bundeswehr Hospital Ulm. The Defense Ministry approved the.
Post GR 09 hosts World War II veteran The American Legion.
War Damage in Baden and Wurttemberg At the end of World War II, soldiers of the Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives MFAA section were tasked with. Bombing of Ulm in World War II data. As he stood in front of and marveled at the majestic Ulm Munster, which was barely damaged by the relentless bombing, he could never have. SECRETS OF THE DEAD: World War Speed KPBS. The city of Ulm was heavily bombed during World War II. The heaviest air raid was on 17 December 1944, which killed and injuring hundreds but left 25000. German army honors member of anti Nazi White Rose News DW. The discovery of an unexploded World War II bomb will force a mass of 12.000 people in the city of Neu Ulm - the third unexploded bomb to.
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This was a German unrealised plan to attack and destroy Soviet electricity generating plants in the Ural mountains region of the USSR using bombers and or. Bombing of Ulm in World War II YouTube. Продолжительность: 4:22. 11th Grade US History Name: World War Two Unit Student Notes. To those in World War II who fought for their countries One can find numerous histories of specific strategic bomb Destruction of the Ulm rail yards. A Saturday in Ulm, Germany Countdown to Friday. Investigators said the group planned to attack soft targets near American military a government office set up in the wake of World War II to identify and monitor Two centers of radical activity cropped up: in Ulm, an Islamic.
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Bombing of Ulm in World War II Visually.
Controversy Quotient 0to 5 2 Fled Nazi Germany in 1933 convinced U.S. to begin developing atomic bomb during World War II later regretted his role in rise. Stealth aircraft Bomber Bombing of Ulm in World War II Airplane, war. This church has lots of history. The foke lour says that in Ww II that the steepel could not be bombed by the American bombers. They dropped a sack of flour on it. World War II: A Chronology. July 1943 Dtic. How this drug affected the course of World War II is an ongoing controversy. right meets with medical historian, Dr. Peter Steinkamp of Ulm University. conquered Poland and were preparing for an attack against France. A brief history of war and drugs: From Vikings to Nazis Germany. The city of Ulm, a city in the federal German state of Baden Wurttemberg, situated on the River Danube, was heavily bombed during World War II. The heaviest.
15 Best Things to Do in Ulm Germany The Crazy Tourist.
In 1919 Kathe and Eugen Beurer were living in poor conditions at Frauenstrasse 57 in Ulm. But the couple, in particular Kathe Beurer as the driving force, had. Old Germany Review of Ulmer Muenster, Ulm, Germany Tripadvisor. Bombing of Ulm in World War II. No description defined. In more languages. Spanish. No label defined. No description defined. Traditional.
Wieland Werke AG, Ulm, Germany dates of survey, 15 16 June, 1945.
And ended many World War Two events and how these events still influence us today. Week 1 day in history first kamikaze attack of the war begins. Emperor Jewish scientist born in Ulm, Germany in. 1879. Chemical and Biological Warfare in World War II Taylor & Francis. Even though Ulm as a whole was badly damaged by bombing during World War II, the church and steeple were left remarkably unscathed. Decisive Battle and the Global War on Terror. The cheapest way to get from Ulm to Podgorica costs only 65€, and the very few Ottoman landmarks that survived the bombing of Podgorica in World War II. Reports US Strategic Bombing Survey at Library of Congress Tech. Germany WWII bomb defused after 12000 evacuated. and disarmed in recent weeks in the Bavarian city of Neu Ulm, home to 50.000 people.
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Author: United States Strategic Bombing Survey Aircraft Division Subject: Wieland Topic: World War, 1939 1945 - Aerial operations, American: Light metals. Tilsit, Tirol, Torgau, Treuenbrietzen, Trier, Ulm, Vienna, Waldenburg. Ulm citizens are naturally proud that this world famous genius was born within the walls of their city. 20, a house reduced to dust by bombs later. Einsteins birth house was completely burnt down during World War II, and is now a flat. Remaining Nazi Sites in Baden Wurttemberg 2 Traces of Evil. The city of Ulm, in the German state of Baden Wurttemberg, was heavily bombed during the closing months of World War II. The first and heaviest raid, on 17 December 1944, left 707 people dead, 613 injured, and 25.000 homeless. Two large truck. Case Studies in Strategic Bombardment. The Allied terror bombing of German towns and cities during WWII, T W entries. Small, peaceful Tilsit evolved around a Teutonic knights castle founded in.
World War II: German Raid on Bari
On the afternoon of December 2, 1943, 1st Lt. Werner Hahn piloted his Messerschmitt Me-210 reconnaissance plane over the port of Bari, in southeastern Italy. Cruising at 23,000 feet, his aircraft made a telltale contrail as he streaked across the sky, but Allied anti-aircraft crews took little notice. Still unmolested, the German pilot made a second pass over the city before turning north toward home. If Hahn’s report was promising, the Luftwaffe would launch a major airstrike against the port.
Bari was a city of some 200,000 people, with an old section of town that dated back to the Middle Ages. Old Bari, clustered on a fist of land that jutted out into the Adriatic, boasted such famed landmarks as the Castello Svevo, a brooding medieval fortress dating to Norman times, and the Basilica San Nicola, which allegedly contained the bones of St. Nicholas.
In contrast, new Bari had broad boulevards and modern buildings. These new buildings included a sports facility nicknamed ‘Bambino Stadium,’ which had been built by Italian dictator Benito Mussolini as a reward to the citizens for producing the most babies in a specified period of time. Bari–old and new–had been fortunate, suffering little damage because the Allies had earmarked the city as a major supply port from the start.
As 1943 drew to a close, Bari’s medieval torpor and somnolent grace were shaken off by the influx of Allied shipping into its harbor. Tons of supplies were offloaded almost around the clock, transforming the once quiet town into a hive of activity. On December 2, at least 30 Allied ships were crowded into the harbor, packed so tightly they almost touched.
The port was under the jurisdiction of the British, in part because Bari was the main supply base for General Bernard Law Montgomery’s Eighth Army. But the city was also the newly designated headquarters of the American Fifteenth Air Force, which had been activated in November of that year. The Fifteenth’s primary mission was to bomb targets in the Balkans, Italy and especially Germany. Fifteenth Air Force commander Maj. Gen. James H. ‘Jimmy’ Doolittle had arrived in Bari on December 1.
The Americans had championed daylight precision bombing, but the Eighth Air Force in England was suffering terrible casualties in order to prove the theory valid. Luftwaffe strength was increasing, not decreasing, over Germany. The Fifteenth Air Force was intended to take some of the pressure off the beleaguered Eighth.
In addition to the usual war materiel, ships moored at Bari carried aviation fuel for Doolittle’s bombers and other much-needed supplies. Selection of Bari as the Fifteenth Air Force headquarters–about 75 miles from the Fifteenth’s primary airfields at Foggia–meant a large infusion of staff personnel. About 200 officers, 52 civilian technicians and several hundred enlisted men were being brought into the city.
Totally absorbed by the task of getting the Fifteenth Air Force off the ground, the Allies gave little thought to the possibility of a German air raid on Bari. The Luftwaffe in Italy was relatively weak and stretched so thin it could hardly mount a major effort. Or so Allied leaders believed.
German reconnaissance flights over Bari were seen as a nuisance. At first, British anti-aircraft batteries fired a half-hearted round or two, but eventually they ignored the German flights altogether. Why waste ammunition?
Responding to rumblings about lax security measures, British Air Vice Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham held a press conference on the afternoon of December 2 and assured reporters that the Luftwaffe was defeated in Italy. He was confident the Germans would never attack Bari. ‘I would regard it as a personal affront and insult,’ the air marshal haughtily declared, ‘if the Luftwaffe would attempt any significant action in this area.’
Not everyone was so sure that the German air force was a broken reed. British army Captain A.B. Jenks, who was responsible for the port’s defense, knew that preparations for an attack were woefully inadequate. But his voice, as well as those of one or two others, was drowned out by a chorus of complacent officers. When darkness came, Bari’s docks were brilliantly lit so unloading of cargo could continue. Little thought was given to the need for a blackout.
In the harbor, cargo ships and tankers waited their turn to be unloaded. Captain Otto Heitmann, skipper of the Liberty ship SS John Bascom, went ashore to see if the process could be speeded up. He was disappointed in his quest, but he might have been even more concerned had he known what was aboard SS John Harvey.
John Harvey, commanded by Captain Elwin F. Knowles, was a typical Liberty ship, scarcely different from the others moored in the harbor. Much of her cargo was also conventional: munitions, food and equipment. But the ship had a deadly secret cargo. Approximately 100 tons of mustard gas bombs were on board. The bombs were meant as a precaution, to be used only if the Germans resorted to chemical warfare.
In 1943 there was a possibility that the Germans just might use poison gas. By that point in the war, the strategic initiative had passed to the Allies, and Germany was on the defensive on all fronts. Adolf Hitler’s forces had sustained a major defeat at Stalingrad, and they had lost North Africa as well. The Allies were now on the Continent, slowly inching their way up the Italian peninsula.
Hitler, it was said, was not a great advocate of chemical warfare, perhaps because the Führer himself had been gassed during World War I. He was, however, ruthless and might be persuaded to use gas if he believed it would redress the strategic balance in his favor. Intelligence reports suggested that the Germans were stocking chemical weapons, including a new chemical agent called Tabun.
American President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued a policy statement condemning the use of gas by any civilized nation, but he pledged that the United States would reply in kind if the enemy dared to use such weapons first. John Harvey was selected to convey a shipment of poison gas to Italy to be held in reserve should such a situation occur.
When the mustard gas bombs were loaded aboard John Harvey, they looked deceptively conventional. Each bomb was 4 feet long, 8 inches in diameter and contained from 60 to 70 pounds of the chemical. Mustard is a blister gas that irritates the respiratory system and produces burns and raw ulcers on the skin. Victims exposed to the gas often suffer an agonizing death.
The poison gas shipment was shrouded in official secrecy. Even Knowles was not formally informed about the lethal cargo. Perceptive members of the crew, however, must have guessed the voyage was out of the ordinary. For one thing, 1st Lt. Howard D. Beckstrom of the 701st Chemical Maintenance Company was on board, along with a detachment of six men. All were expert in handling toxic materials and were obviously there for a purpose.
John Harvey crossed the Atlantic without incident, successfully running the gantlet of German submarines that still infested the ocean. After a stop at Oran, Algeria, the ship sailed to Augusta, Sicily, before proceeding to Bari. Lieutenant Thomas H. Richardson, the ship’s cargo security officer, was one of the few people on board who officially knew about the mustard gas. His manifest clearly listed 2,000 M47A1 mustard gas bombs in the hold.
Richardson naturally wanted to unload the deadly cargo as soon as possible, but when the ship reached Bari on November 26, his hopes were dashed. The harbor was crammed with shipping, and another convoy was due shortly. Dozens of vessels were stacked up along the piers and jetties, each waiting its turn to be unloaded. Since the lethal gas was not officially on board, John Harvey was not about to be given special priority.
For the next five nerve-racking days, John Harvey rode peacefully at anchor at Pier 29 while Captain Knowles tried vainly to get British port officials to speed things up. This was difficult, because he was gagged by the secrecy that surrounded the gas shipment. How could he get officials to act when he was not even supposed to know that he was carrying the mustard gas in the first place?
While Knowles fretted, German reconnaissance pilot Hahn had returned to base. His positive report about conditions at Bari set in motion a raid that had been discussed and planned some time before. The Bari attack was the product of a planning session between Luftwaffe Field Marshal Albert Kesselring and his subordinates. The Allied airfields at Foggia were discussed as possible targets, but Luftwaffe resources were stretched too thin to permit the effective bombing of such a large complex of targets.
It was Field Marshal Wolfram von Richthofen, commander of Luftflotte 2, who suggested Bari as an alternative. A cousin of famed World War I ace Manfred von Richthofen, the field marshal was an experienced officer who had served in Poland and the Soviet Union as well as in the Battle of Britain. His advice, Kesselring knew, was sound. Richthofen believed that if the port was crippled, the British Eighth Army’s advance might be slowed and the nascent Fifteenth Air Force’s bomber offensive delayed. Richthofen told Kesselring that the only planes available for such a task were his Junkers Ju-88 A-4 bombers. With luck, he might scrape together 150 such planes for the raid.
When the strike force was mustered, there were only 105 Ju-88s available for the mission. But the element of surprise, coupled with an attack at dusk, might shift the odds in the Germans’ favor. Most of the planes would come from Italy, but Richthofen purposely wanted to obfuscate matters by using a few Ju-88s from Yugoslavia. If the Allies thought the entire mission originated from there, they just might misdirect retaliatory strikes to the Balkans.
The Ju-88 pilots were ordered to fly their twin-engine bombers east to the Adriatic, then swing south and west. British anti-aircraft would probably expect an attack–if any–to come from the north, not from the west. The Ju-88s were also supplied with Duppel, thin strips of tinfoil cut to various lengths. The tinfoil registered like aircraft on radar screens, producing scores of phantom targets.
The aim of the German pilots was to arrive over Bari around 7:30 p.m. Parachute flares would be released first to light the way for the attacking aircraft, and the Ju-88s would come in low, trying to get under Allied radar that was already confused by the Duppel.
The Germans arrived at Bari on schedule. First Lieutenant Gustav Teuber, leading the first wave, could hardly believe his eyes. The docks were brilliantly lit cranes stood out in sharp relief as they unloaded cargo from the ships’ gaping holds, and the east jetty was packed with ships.
Scores of Ju-88s descended on Bari like gigantic birds of prey, their attack illuminated by the city’s lights and German flares. The first bombs hit the city proper, great geysers of smoke and flame marking each detonation, but soon it was the harbor’s turn. Some 30 vessels were riding at anchor that night, and each ship’s crew had to respond to the emergency as best they could. Surprise was total, and some ships had to function without a full complement, since many sailors were on shore leave.
The German flares gave sailors the first inkling of the impending attack. Aboard John Bascom, the second officer, William Rudolf, saw the flashes and alerted Captain Heitmann. John Bascom‘s gun crew sprang into action, joining the barrage that shore batteries were now hurling into the sky. Tracer bullets laced the air, but the anti-aircraft fire was largely ineffective.
There was no time to cut anchor cables and get underway crews along the east jetty watched helplessly while a creeping barrage of German bombs came ever closer to their vulnerable vessels. Joseph Wheeler took a direct hit and exploded into flames John Motley took a bomb in its No. 5 hold. John Bascom, anchored next to John Motley, was next in line for punishment.
John Bascom shuddered under a rain of bombs that hit her from stem to stern. One of the explosions lifted Captain Heitmann off his feet and slammed him against the wheelhouse door. Momentarily stunned, his hands and face bloody, Heitmann saw the body of Nicholas Elgin sprawled nearby, blood pumping from a head wound, his clothes torn off by the force of the blast.
The ship’s bridge was partly destroyed, the decks were buckled and debris was everywhere. There was nothing left to do but abandon ship. Ignoring his own wounds, Heitmann ordered the crew into the single undamaged lifeboat. By now, the entire harbor was a hell on earth, where yellow-orange flames leaped into the air, producing dense columns of acrid smoke. Ships were in various stages of burning or sinking. When flames reached munitions-laden holds, some exploded. The surface of the water was covered by a viscous scum of oil and fuel, blinding and choking those unlucky enough to be in the water.
Meanwhile, the crew of John Harvey was engaged in a heroic battle to save their ship. The vessel still was intact and had sustained no direct bomb damage. Nevertheless, she had caught fire, and the situation was doubly dangerous with the mustard gas bombs aboard. Captain Knowles, Lieutenant Beckstrom and others on board refused to leave their posts, but their heroism was ultimately in vain.
Without warning, John Harvey blew up, disappearing in a huge, mushroom-shaped fireball that hurled pieces of the ship and her cargo hundreds of feet into the air. Everyone on board was killed instantly, and all over the harbor the force of the concussion knocked men off their feet. The blast sent out multihued fingers of smoke like a Fourth of July fireworks celebration and made the harbor as bright as day.
The men aboard USS Pumper, a tanker carrying aviation fuel, were witnesses to John Harvey‘s last moments. Air initially rushed into the vortex of the blast, then the concussion radiated out to knock the tanker 35 degrees to port.
Meanwhile, Heitmann and his surviving crew managed to reach the tip of the east jetty, around a lighthouse that was located at its north end. He had about 50 men. Many were badly wounded, and some were so badly burned that the slightest touch brought agony. At first the lighthouse area seemed a refuge, but it soon became apparent it was more of a deathtrap. A sea of flames cut Heitmann and his men off from following the jetty’s long spine into the city, where they might have been relatively safe.
While the sailors waited to be rescued, Ensign K.K. Vesole, commander of John Bascom‘s armed guard detachment, was having difficulty breathing. Many of the other men were gasping, but it was Vesole who noted something strange about the smoke. ‘I smell garlic,’ he said, without realizing the implications of his remark. A garlic odor was a telltale sign of mustard gas. The gas had become liberally intermixed with the oil that floated in the harbor and lurked in the smoke that permeated the area.
Mustard gas-laced oil now coated the bodies of Allied seamen as they struggled in the water, and many swallowed the noxious mixture. Even those not in the water inhaled liberal doses of gas, as did hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Italian civilians. A launch dispatched from Pumper rescued Captain Heitmann and the other John Bascom survivors from the east jetty, but their troubles were just beginning.
The German raid began at 7:30 p.m. and ended 20 minutes later. German losses were very light, and they had succeeded beyond their most sanguine expectations. Seventeen Allied ships were sunk and another eight were damaged, causing Bari to be dubbed the’second Pearl Harbor.’ The Americans sustained the highest losses, losing the Liberty ships John Bascom, John L. Motley, Joseph Wheeler, Samuel J. Tilden and John Harvey. The British lost four ships, the Italians three, the Norwegians three and the Poles two.
The next morning survivors woke to a scene of utter devastation. Large parts of Bari had been reduced to rubble, particularly the medieval old town. Portions of the city and the harbor were still burning, and a thick pall of black smoke hung in the sky. There were more than 1,000 military and merchant marine casualties about 800 were admitted to local hospitals. The full extent of civilian casualties may never be known. Conservative estimates hover around 1,000, though there were probably more.
Fortunately, Bari was the site of several Allied military hospitals and related support facilities. Some were housed at the Bari Polyclinic, built by Mussolini as a showcase of Fascist health care. The Polyclinic was home to the 98th British General Hospital and the 3rd New Zealand Hospital, among others. Those facilities received many of the mustard gas victims that began to appear.
Casualties from the raid began pouring in until the hospitals were filled to overflowing. Almost immediately some of the wounded began to complain of ‘gritty’ eyes, and their condition worsened in spite of conventional treatment. Their eyes were swollen, and skin lesions began to appear. Swamped with wounded of all descriptions and still not realizing they were dealing with poison gas, hospital staffers allowed victims to remain in their oil-and-gas-soaked clothes for long periods.
Not only were the victims severely burned and blistered from prolonged exposure, but their respiratory systems were also badly irritated. The mustard gas casualties were wracked with coughs and had real difficulty breathing, but the hospital staff seemed helpless in the face of this unknown ailment. Men started to die, and even those who did recover faced a long and painful convalescence. Temporary blindness, the agony of burns and a terrible swelling of the genitals produced both physical and mental anguish.
As the victims began to die, the doctors started to suspect that some kind of chemical agent was involved. Some physicians pointed fingers at the Germans, speculating that they had resorted to chemical warfare after all. A message was sent to Allied headquarters in Algiers informing Deputy Surgeon General Fred Blesse that patients were dying of a ‘mysterious malady.’ To solve the mystery, Blesse dispatched Lt. Col. Stewart Francis Alexander, an expert on chemical warfare medicine, to Bari.
Alexander examined the patients and interviewed them when appropriate. It was beginning to look like mustard gas exposure, but the doctor was not sure. His suspicions were confirmed when a bomb-casing fragment was recovered from the bottom of the harbor. The fragment was identified as an American M47A1 bomb, which was designated for possible delivery of mustard gas. The Germans could be eliminated as suspects in this case, the Allies were to blame.
Alexander still did not know where the mustard bombs had originated. The doctor tallied the number of mustard deaths in each ship, then plotted the position of the ships in the harbor. Most of the victims came from ships anchored near John Harvey. British port authorities finally admitted off the record that they knew John Harvey was carrying poison gas. Alexander drew up a report detailing his findings, which was approved by Allied Supreme Commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower.
Secrecy still dogged the whole affair, however. Eventually, the British and American people were told of the devastating Bari raid, but the part played by mustard gas was kept from them. British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill was particularly adamant that this aspect of the tragedy remain a secret. It was embarrassing enough that the raid occurred at a port under British jurisdiction. Churchill believed that publicizing the fiasco would hand the Germans a propaganda coup.
Although the gas was mentioned in official American records, Churchill insisted British medical records be purged and mustard gas deaths listed as the result of ‘burns due to enemy action.’ Churchill’s attempts at secrecy may have caused more deaths, because had the word gone out, more victims, especially Italian civilians, might have sought proper treatment. Axis Sally, the infamous propaganda broadcaster, learned the truth and taunted the Allies. ‘I see you boys are getting gassed by your own poison gas,’ she sneered.
There were 628 mustard gas casualties among Allied military and merchant marine personnel. Of these, 69 died within two weeks. Most victims, however, like Captain Heitmann of John Bascom, fully recovered. But the figures do not include the uncounted Italian civilians who must have been exposed to the deadly chemical. There was a mass exodus of civilians out of the city after the raid. Some were probably gas victims who died for want of proper treatment.
The deaths and injuries were terrible tragedies, but Bari was a strategic disaster as well. The port was completely closed for three full weeks after the terrible incident. On January 12, 1944, General Mark Clark’s Fifth Army launched an offensive, part of an overall push that included the Anglo-American landings at Anzio some days later. Elements of the Fifth Army crossed the Rapido River and established a bridgehead, only to be forced to withdraw due to lack of supplies. Bad weather was the official cause of the supply problems, but the closing of Bari was probably a major factor.
The Fifteenth Air Force suffered setbacks as well because of the German success at Bari. Just two days after the raid, the Fifteenth had been scheduled to act in concert with the Eighth Air Force in a combined offensive against Germany. The Bari raid sharply curtailed the Fifteenth’s participation in that offensive. In fact, the Fifteenth Air Force did not make a major contribution to the war until after February 1944.
The Bari raid was a twofold disaster. On one hand, it was truly a second Pearl Harbor, one of the most notable Luftwaffe exploits of the war. But it was also the only poison gas incident of World War II, a tragedy made worse by the perceived exigencies of wartime secrecy.
This article was written by Eric Niderost and originally appeared in World War II magazine.
Events in History at the Time the Novel Takes Place
World War II
The United States entered World War II in December 1941, after the Japanese bombed a naval base at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii. Joining the key Allied forces of Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union, American troops battled the major Axis powers—Hitler’s Nazi Germany, Italy, and Japan. When U.S. troops landed in Normandy, France, in June 1944, the Allied forces gained a greater advantage in the war. The Battle of the Bulge, the last major offensive by the German army, was fought in December 1944. In the battle, Allied troops set out to invade Nazioccupied Belgium, but encountered a major Nazi counterattack. The Germans penetrated the Allied defenses in a bulgelike pattern—hence the name of the battle. A long stretch of poor weather protected the Germans from air attacks, as did the slow reaction time of Allied ground forces both factors enabled the Germans to push their battle line deep into Allied territory. Though the battle was ultimately a victory for the Allies, there were many casualties on both sides. The Germans took approximately one hundred American prisoners of war and transported them by train in cattle boxcars to Dresden, a city located on the Elbe River in southeastern Germany.
The city of Dresden has been called “Florence on the Elbe” because before World War II it was regarded as one of the most beautiful urban centers in the world, renowned for its architecture and great art treasures. This baroque German city is spread along the Elbe River valley, to the north of which lie the Lossnitz ridges, the woods of the Dresdener Heide, and the steep slopes of the Lausitz granite plateau to the south are the foothills of the Erzgebirge Mountains. Dresden has several world-famous museums and galleries, most notably the Zwinger Palace, which houses a number of valuable collections. In a square north of the Zwinger sits a Renaissancestyle building that is home to works of art by Antonio Allegri da Corregio, Titian, Peter Paul Rubens, Anthony Van Dyck, and Rembrandt van Rijn. Dresden also has a great opera tradition. Composers such as Johann Strauss and Richard Wagner performed in the city’s beautiful opera house overlooking the Elbe.
The Yalta Conference
By January 1945, the defeat of Germany by Allied forces was imminent and final plans for the end of the war were being laid out. On February 4, 1945, British prime minister Winston Churchill, American president Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Soviet leader Josef Stalin met in Yalta in the southern Soviet Union to discuss the end of the war and its aftermath. The leaders agreed on a plan to cause final damage to Hitler’s army by initiating a massive strategic air attack on the German cities of Berlin, Dresden, Leipzig, and Chemnitz. It was believed that these attacks would cause severe confusion among civilian refugees as they evacuated the cities, thus hampering the movement of Nazi troops from the west, and that it would also knock out numerous systems of communication in Germany. The plan went by the code name “Thunderclap.” At the time, Dresden was a city overcrowded with refugees from Russia, prisoners of war, evacuated children, and forced laborers. Its population had more than doubled, and many homeless people were living in the streets of the beautiful city. Although Dresden was listed at the Yalta conference as a point of attack, it was not a major industrial or communications center, since it contained no railways, bridges, stations, or factories.
On February 13, 1945, the initial attack from the Allied forces hit Dresden. The first wave of 244 British Lancaster bombers was followed by another 500, which dropped 4000-to-8000 pounds of bombs that were designed to blast the roofs from buildings and expose them to the firebombs that followed. It became the heaviest air raid in history and created a firestorm that was absolutely unstoppable, encompassing an area of forty miles in diameter. Shortly after midday on February 14, 1945, the Americans staged the third wave of the attack with 300 B-17 bombers that dropped 771 tons of bombs on an already devastated city. An estimated 130,000’ to 250,000 people were killed in the air raid, almost all of them civilians. Later that year in the war against Japan, the United States would drop atomic bombs on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but the consequent death toll would be considerably less than the estimated casualties from the bombing of Dresden. The ultimate irony was that there was no real reason for the raid, as it had no effect on the subsequent defeat of Germany. The bombing of Dresden, to this day, remains a subject of great controversy.
York’s air raids: The unfolding story of how the city was bombed during the Second World WarYork Guildhall burns after the bombing raid of April 1942. Photograph: Explore York Libraries and Archives
It’s been 75 years since the largest air raid on York by the enemy German forces.
The city was severely affected by the bombing raids, leaving thousands of homes, businesses and public spaces destroyed. To mark Remembrance Sunday YorkMix has looked at York’s air raid history.
March 1937 – Air Raid Wardens Service created
The service saw 1.5 million volunteers across the UK responsible for escorting people to air raid shelters, handling unexploded bombs and checking an area was safe.
By the end of the Second World War 6,383 wardens had lost their lives.
In York alone 1,000 volunteers kept the city as safe as they could.
The co-ordination of response to an air raid took place within the 15th century Guildhall.
From here it was decided that 36 public shelters would be installed before the air raids could take place. The largest was in Lower Priory Street, able to hold 477 people.
August 11 1940 – Four bombs fall on York
Four individual bombs fell in and around the city.
York cemetery was hit causing damage to the gravestones and surrounding area. One bomb lay unexploded between Clifford’s Tower and Piccadilly.
November 1940 – York Waterworks bomb
A bomb targeted York Waterworks, but penetrated the soft ground and caused very little damage.
October 1941 – German map created
After the war German documentation of the bombing targets was revealed. A map dated October 1941 highlights the railway station, the Minster and the Terry’s factory as areas of bombing interest.
April 29 1942 – the Baedeker raid
The Baedeker Blitz was the worst air raid to hit York.
The Germans’ decision to hit York followed the RAF’s raid on the German city of Lubeck of March the same year.
It is believed that the city was chosen for its historical, cultural and industrial attributes. On the night the targets were strategic: the railway station, the carriageworks, the airfield.
More than 70 German planes were involved in the raid. Allied planes shot down four of them aircraft. Beginning at 2.30am and finishing 90 minutes later, the raid left 92 people dead and hundreds injured.
Houses and schools were destroyed, the Guildhall and St Martin-le-Grand Church on Coney Street burnt out. The Bar Convent collapsed after being hit, killing five nuns.
August 9 1942 – lone raider
A lone raider dropped four bombs in the centre of the city. Despite two bombs going unexploded, one person was killed, nine injured and 36 suffered minor injuries.
The rebuilding of York after the 1942 raids took decades.
But there is still evidence of the damage, including in the remains of St Martin-le-Grand.
And for those who lived through ‘York’s darkest night’ the memories are still strong.